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JURISDICTION

This appeal is from the district court's September 30, 2015, Order
~

dismissing Defendant-Appellant Mark Haik's counterclaims, which the district
court certified as final under Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b) on January 7, 2016. This Court
has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code§ 78A-3-102G). 1
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1.

Did the district court correctly hold that Mr. Haik was barred by res

judicata from relitigating the counterclaims? Whether a claim is barred by res
judicata is a question of law the Court reviews for correctness. Gillmor v. Family
Link, LLC, 2012 UT 38,

,r 9,

284 P.3d 622. Federal common law applies .I/when

deciding if a federal court's decision has preclusive effect on a subsequent state
l.$i

court proceeding." Oman v. Davis Sch. Dist. 2008 UT 70,

,r 28, n.5, 194 P.3d 956.

This issue was preserved in Salt Lake City Corporation's motion to dismiss the

counterclaims. (R. 3008-43).

Mr. Haik cites Utah Code§ 78A-3-102(3)(e)(v), which confers jurisdiction in this
Court over u final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings
originating with ... the state engineer." That section is inapplicable. The order
dismissing the counterclaims is not a "final order and decree in formal
adjudicative proceedings." Even if the order had been on the First Cause of
Action - the only judicial review in this case- the correct section would be
102(3)(£), as the state engineer proceedings were informal, not formal.

1

2.

Does this Court lack jurisdiction to consider Mr. Haik' s arguments

regarding the district court's non-final denial of his motion to dismiss the
Amended Petition for Judicial Review and Complaint?

"This court is the

exclusive judge of its own jurisdiction." Powell v. Cannon, 2008 UT 19,

,r 9, 179

P.3d 799 (internal quotation marks omitted). "The question of whether an order
is final and appealable is a question of law." Id.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is an appeal from the district court's dismissal of Mr. Haik's
counterclaims, which seek to force Salt Lake City to provide water for
development of Mr. Haik' s dry lots in Albion Basin. The district court dismissed
the claims on the basis that they were or could have been litigated in two
previous cases,2 and therefore were barred by res judicata.
SLC filed this case against Mr. Haik and others seeking judicial review of
the State Engineer's approval of two water right change applications.

The

. Second Cause of Action sought adjudication of the validity, nature, and priority
of Mr. Haik's (and others') claimed water rights.3

The district court's

Copies of the U.S. District Court and Tenth Circuit decisions in these two cases
are included in the Addendum.

2

Those water rights derive from mother right 57-7800. In Haik v. Sandy City, 2011
UT 26, 254 P.3d 171, this Court upheld a district court's decision holding Mr.

3
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proceedings on the Second Cause of Action are ongoing and no appealable final
order has been entered on the claim.

Mr. Haik asserted five counterclaims. Mr. Haik's counterclaims request
the following:
1.

A declaration under Article XI,§ 6 of the Utah Constitution that he is
entitled "to water supply as authorized by Water Rights 57-10013
(a16844) or 57-10015 (a16846) to serve homes in Albion Basin
Subdivision." (R. 2779,

2.

,r 122.).

A declaration that SLC's refusal to provide water to his lots treats
him differently from other nearby landowners and therefore violates
equal protection under Article I, § 24 of the Utah Constitution.

(R. 2779-80, ,r,r 124-25.)
3.

A declaration that SLC's refusal to supply water to his lots violates
his due process rights under Article I,§ 7 of the Utah Constitution.

(R. 2780,
4.

,r,r 127.)
II

A declaration determining the validity of appropriation by the City
as expressed in Water Right 57-10015 (a16846) or Water Right 57-

Haik and others have a superior claim to title to their respective portions of
water right 57-7800 as against Sandy City.
-3-

10013 (a16844) due to an expressed intent not (1) to apply the
appropriated water to the stated beneficial use; and (2) refusal and
failure to supply appropriated water within a reasonable time to the
stated beneficial use." (R. at 2781,
5.

~

,r 129.)

A declaration that SLC' s service of water outside of its municipal

~-

\ijiil

boundaries is subject to public regulation, presumably by the Public
Service Commission. (R. 2781,

,r 132.)

The counterclaims represent the latest chapter in what has been described
by the Tenth Circuit as "an ongoing saga" between Mr. Haik, his father, and their
predecessor in interest, Marvin Melville, and SLC. Haik v. Salt Lake City Corp.,
567 F. App'x 621, 623 (10th Cir. 2014) (Haik II). Forty years ago, Mr. Melville
sued Salt Lake County challenging his inability to obtain a building permit for
his property in the Albion Basin, located within the present day boundaries of
the Town of Alta in Little Cottonwood Canyon, based on the Salt Lake County
Board of Health's requirement of 400 gallons of water per day, per domestic unit.
Melville v. Salt Lake County, 570 P. 2d 687 (Utah 1977). Mr. Melville lost when this

Court held that he had "at most" a contract right to 50 gallons per day (gpd), far
less than the required 400 gpd. Id. at 689.

-4-

~

In 1994, Mr. Haik and his father purchased four undeveloped lots from
Mr. Melville. Haik v. Town of Alta, No. 97-4202, 1999 WL 190717, at *1 (10th Cir.

Apr. 5, 1999) (Haik 1). Since that time, the Haiks have attempted to develop their
lots, but have been unable to do so in part because of the inadequate water
Q

supply. As a result of this inability, the Haiks sued the Town of Alta and SLC in
1996, seeking, among other things, an order requiring SLC to provide water to
their lots. Haik I, 1999 WL 190717. Their efforts failed. Id. The U.S. District
Court for the District of Utah Oudge Jenkins) and the Tenth Circuit both
recognized that SLC has no obligation to serve water (or to allow service of
water) to the Haiks' lots, and that its refusal to do so is a rational decision guided
by ordinance and protection of critical watershed. Haik v. Town of Alta, No. 2:96cv-723J, Memorandum Opinion & Order at 20-21 (D. Utah Oct. 31, 1997), aff' d,

Haik I, 1999 WL 190717, at *3-5. That case and the resulting decisions will be
~

referred to throughout as Haik I.
Undeterred, the Haiks again sued the Town of Alta and Salt Lake City in
2012 seeking, among other things, the same relief-a mandate that SLC supply
water to their Albion Basin lots. Haik II, 567 F. App'x 621. The U.S. District
Court (Judge Stewart) and the Tenth Circuit again refused to grant the Haiks'
requested relief, holding that neither the provisions of the Utah or United States

-5-

Constitutions, relevant statutes and case law, nor approved change applications
on SLC water rights obligate SLC to supply water to the Hai.ks' lots. Haik II, No.
2:12-CV-997 TS, 2013 WL 968141, at *9 (D. Utah Mar. 12, 2013), affd, 567 F. App'x

~

621 (10th Cir. 2014). That case and the resulting decisions will be referred to
throughout as Haik II.

In the interim years, the Hai.ks continued to challenge SLC' s refusal to
supply water to their lots through repeated interactions with SLC, Salt Lake
County, Town of Alta, and Salt Lake County Board of Health, among others.
Those challenges include a 2013 suit Mr. Haik brought against the Salt Lake
County Board of Health alleging that it violated his state and federal due process
rights in denying his renewed applications for the necessary septic permits. Haik
v. Salt Lake County Bd. of Health, 604 F. App'x 659 (10th Cir. 2015). The Salt Lake

County Board of Heath removed the case to federal court, and the U.S. District
Court Gudge Stewart) summarily dismissed Mr. Hai.k's claims. Id. at 662. On
appeal, Mr. Haik argued that the district court lacked jurisdiction because the
removal was improper given that his complaint raised issues primarily of state
law. Id. The Tenth Circuit disagreed, noting that "his complaint plainly seeks to
raise issues of federal law." Id. It held that removal was nevertheless improper
"because none of his claims present a substantial question of federal law" given

-6-

G;;;

that the Tenth Circuit had "twice already affirmed district court rulings that Mr.
Haik does not have a protected property interest in those permits so as to
support his due process claims." Id. (emphasis in origIDal). The Tenth Circuit
thus remanded with instructions to the district court to remand to the state court
~

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 4 Id. at 663.
As with Haik I and Haik II, the counterclaims in this case center on Mr.
Haik' s contention that SLC has an obligation to provide him water for his Albion
Basin lots. (R. 2756-83.) During the hearing on SLC' s motion to dismiss, counsel
for Mr. Haik conceded that the First through Third Counterclaims were raised in
either or both Haik I and Haik II. (R. 6204-05.) Specifically, with respect to the
First Counterclaim, he stated, "in the first Stewart decision [Haik Il], yes, the
judge ruled against us on our interpretation of Article XI, Section 6." (R. 6186.)
When questioned as to whether the equal protection claim "under the state

~

constitution [was] raised in [Haik 1]," counsel for Mr. Haik responded, "yes, there
were equal protection, disparate treatment. And these were the same facts that
Mr. Haik implies that that the Tenth Circuit reversed a determination that his
clairn.s were barred by res judicata. (Appellant's Br. at 39.) Mr. Haik made this
argument to the district court. (R. 3474.) As discussed above, the Tenth Circuit
reversed and remanded precisely because Mr. Haik' s federal claims were barred
by res judicata, thereby leaving no substantial issue of federal law that would
support removal- it did not, as Mr. Haik implies, hold that his claims were not
barred by res judicata.
4

-7-

were at issue." (R. 6192.) Counsel for Mr. Haik then described what Mr. Haik is
seeking on "the first three counts": .(/we're seeking simply declaration of how do
our rights and circumstances exist in this circumstance, was the Tenth Circuit
right, was the Tenth Circuit wrong in what's its interpretations of these state
constitutional interests were as they apply to the facts." (R. 6194-95.)
Following this exchange, the Court granted SLC' s motion to dismiss Mr.
Haik' s counterclaims. It explained:
While I appreciate the clarification and, frankly, Mr. Haik, the
candor of what we're really looking at, at least as to counts 1
through 3, is did the Tenth Circuit get it right. I appreciate that the
Utah Supreme Court has reserved the right to make its
interpretations of state constructional law. It's certainly not bound
by that. But as to parties, parties are bound by the resolutions they
bring to finality, whether they take the fede:al track or the state
track.
So it may well be that your proposition as a legal proposition
is that the Tenth Circuit got it wrong. That may well be true, but
that's really something that res judicata assumes is that we're not
going to get into that analysis because it's been litigated fully.
So with respect to counts 1, 2, 3, there's a concession here that
those specific issues were raised in the earlier federal action - in the
Stewart action, that is the first Stewart action- and on that basis, I'm
going to grant the motion as to those claims. (R. 6204-05.)
The district court further granted the motion as to the Fourth and Fifth
Counterclaims, explaining that, while they

11

may well not have been raised

specifically, ... they could have been raised. They come out of the same factual

-8-

~

circumstances.

And this is a case not just for issue preclusion, but claim

preclusion." (R. 6205.) As the district court put it, "There has to be an end."

(R. 6205.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

I.

The district court properly held that Mr. Haik is barred by res judicata
from relitigating his counterclaims.
~

Issue preclusion prevents Mr. Haik from relitigating his First through
Fourth Counterclaims.

The issues central to each of those respective

counterclaims were decided in either Haik I or Haik II or both. In addition, the
issue of whether two approved SLC change applications impose an obligation
~

upon SLC under Article XI,§ 6 to serve water to Mr. Hai.k's Albion Basin lotsan issue that, by Mr. Hai.k's own description, underlies the First through Fourth

~

Counterclaims - was explicitly decided in SLC' s favor in Haik II.
Claim preclusion further applies to bar the relitigation of the counterclaims
because the First, Second, and Third Counterclaims were admittedly asserted in
either or both Haik I and Haik II, which involved the same parties and resulted in
final judgments on the merits. While the Fourth and Fifth Counterclaims were
not previously raised as such, they arise out of the same transactions that gave

-9-

rise to the two prior federal cases. Nothing has changed since 2012 that would
bring the counterclaims outside the realm of claim preclusion. SLC's assertion of
the Second Cause of Action in this case, based on an injury to its long-held water
rights in Little Cottonwood Creek, does not constitute a "new fact," nor are the
II

II

counterclaims new and independent claims" based on this new fact."
Mr. Haik's contention that the final federal court decisions in Haik I and

Haik II can never have claim preclusive effect because they involve state law or
state constitutional claims, is frivolous. State law claims that either were or could
have been raised in a prior federal case cannot be litigated in a subsequent state
court case because of claim preclusion. Issues that were previously decided by a
federal court applying state law standards likewise cannot be litigated in a
subsequent state court case because of issue preclusion.
II.

To the extent Mr. Haik seeks review of the district court's denial of his
motion to dismiss the Amended Petition for Judicial Review and Complaint, the
Court lacks jurisdiction. The district court has allowed SLC and the District to
continue to prosecute their Second Cause of Action. The interlocutory order
denying the motion to dismiss is not a final appealable order because it did not

-10-

C

~

resolve all claims against all parties, and does not fall within any of the
exceptions to the final judgment rule.
ARGUMENT

I.

THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY HELD THAT MR.
HAIK IS BARRED BY RES JUDICATA FROM
RELITIGATING HIS COUNTERCLAIMS.

In the words of the Tenth Circuit, Mr. Haik' s assertion of the counterclaims
in this case is the latest in the "ongoing saga" between him, his father, and their

predecessor in interest and SLC. Mr. Haik has used this case, which involves the
question of the validity, nature, and priority of his claimed Little Cottonwood
Creek water right, as his next forum to advance the same arguments he has been
advancing for decades:
~

that SLC has an obligation to serve water to his

undeveloped lots in the Albion Basin, and its refusal to do so violates Mr. Haik' s
rights. This is an issue wholly separate from the question of what, if anything,

Mr. Haik acquired through the purported conveyance of 1/ 6 of mother water
right 57-7800 - the issue raised by SLC in the Second Cause of Action. It is
further an issue that has been repeatedly decided against Mr. Haik. In light of
this fact, the district court was correct in dismissing Mr. Haik' s counterclaims as

barred by res judicata.

...

·~

-11-

The doctrine of res judicata "encompasses two distinct barriers to repeat
litigation: claim preclusion and issue preclusion." Park Lake Res. Ltd. Liab. v. U.S.

Dep't of Agr., 378 F.3d 1132, 1135 (10th Cir. 2004). 5 "[I]ssue preclusion bars a

~

party from relitigating an issue once it has suffered an adverse determination on
the issue, even if the issue arises when the party is pursuing or defending against
a different claim." Id. at 1136 (internal quotation marks omitted). "Under [claim
preclusion], a final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties or
their privies from relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in that
action." Id. Both apply here to bar Mr. Haik from relitigating his counterclaims.
A.

The counterclaims raise the same issues that were
decided against Mr. Haik in the prior federal cases.

"[I]ssue preclusion bars a party from relitigating an issue once it has
suffered an adverse deterntination on the issue, even if the issue arises when the
party is pursuing or defending against a different claim." Park Lake, 378 F.3d at
1136. Issue preclusion applies when four requirements are satisfied:
(1) the issue previously decided is identical with the one presented
in the action in question, (2) the prior action has been finally
adjudicated on the merits, (3) the party against whom the doctrine is
invoked was a party, or in privity with a party, to the prior

II

Federal common law applies when deciding if a federal court's decision has
preclusive effect on a subsequent state court proceeding." Oman v. Davis Sch.
Dist. 2008 UT 70, ,r 28, n.5, 194 P.3d 956.

5
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'-'

adjudication, and (4) the party against whom the doctrine is raised
had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior
action.
~

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Mr. Haik does not dispute that he was a party to both Haik I and Haik II.

~

Nor does he dispute that those cases resulted in judgments on the merits or that
he had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues raised in those cases.
Rather, Mr. Haik argues that the issues raised in the counterclaims are different
than those raised in Haik I and Haik II (Appellant's Br. at 48-49).

This is

inaccurate.
The five issues raised in the counterclaims that were identical to those
raised in either or both Haik I and Haik II are: (a) whether Utah Const. Article XI,
;~

§

6 obligates SLC to supply water outside of its municipal boundary, but within

its service area; (b) whether SLC's refusal to supply water to Mr. Haik's Albion
~

Basin lots violates his right to equal protection; (c) whether Mr. Haik has a
protectable property interest in receiving water from SLC; (d) whether SLC's
appr'?ved change applications obligate it to put the water to beneficial use in the
manner identified in the change applications; and (e) whether SLC's change
applications impose a constitutional obligation on SLC to supply water to Mr.
Haik' s Albion Basin lots. Each of these issues was decided in Haik I or Haik II or

-··

'\/iif/
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both. Issues (a) through (d) are necessary to Mr. Haik's First through Fourth
Counterclaims, respectively. 6 Issue (e) is the overarching issue Mr. Haik seeks to
litigate through his counterclaims.

1.

Issues (a) through (d), which are necessary to
Mr. Haik's First through Fourth Counterclaims,
were previously decided against Mr. Haik.

In his First Counterclaim, Mr. Haik requests a declaration under Article XI,
§ 6 as to his "entitlement to water supply as authorized by Water Rights 57-10013

(a16844) or 57-10015 (a16846) to serve homes in Albion Basin Subdivision."

(R. 2777,

,r 122.)

This issue was decided in Haik II. The district court rejected the

Haiks' argument that Article XI, § 6, County Water System, Inc. v. Salt Lake City,
and Platt v. Town of Torrey, when read together, "require[e] the city to provide
water to them, especially in light of the change applications which, if perfected,
would allow the city to do so." Haik v. Salt Lake City Corp., No. 2:12-CV-997 TS,

Mr. Haik argues that the issue raised in the Fifth Counterclaim (declaratory
relief that SLC is subject to public regulation) is not identical to any previouslylitigated issue. (Appellant's Br. at 48-49.) SLC has never claimed that it is.
Rather, the Fifth Counterclaim is barred by claim preclusion. Further, if Mr.
Haik is barred by issue prec;:lusion from relitigating the issue of whether he is
entitled to receive water from SLC, he likely lacks standing to assert his Fifth
Counterclaim. Any alleged injury to him caused by the non-regulation of SLC s
service of water outside of its municipal boundaries necessarily requires that Mr.
Haik have some right to receive water from SLC. Without that right, Mr. Haik
has no personal stake in the issue.
6

-14-

G.,i

2013 WL 968141, at *9 (D. Utah Mar. 12, 2013) (unpublished), affd, 567 F. App'x
621 (10th Cir. 2014). It explained, "When read together, these statements do not
require the city to provide water to Plaintiffs, they merely permit the city to do so
and, if the city so chooses, a reasonableness requirement is imposed. Nor do
~

these provisions stand for the proposition that the city cannot have legitimate
reasons (such as the protection of the watershed) to decline to supply water to
nomesidents." Id.
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed, holding,
Even assuming the lots are now within the city's service area,
this fact doesn't entitle the Haiks to more water. To be sure, Article
XI, Section 6 of the Utah Constitution mandates that a municipality
supply water owned by it to its inhabitants at reasonable charges.
But Article XI, Section 6 says nothing of "others beyond the limits of
the city," and just because the Haiks' lots now fall within Salt Lake
City's service area, it does not follow that the Haiks are now Salt
Lake City inhabitants as well.
Consistent with the Utah Constitution, Utah courts do not
impose a duty on municipalities like Salt Lake City to supply water
to nonresidents like the Haiks.
Haik II, 567 F. _}\pp'x at 629-30 (internal citations omitted). The Tenth Circuit

l.(Q

further stated that it was "not persuaded that even th[e reasonableness]
requirement [the plaintiffs advocated] applies."

-~

Id. at 630.

There was no

authority "require[ing] a municipality to have a reasonable basis for refusing to
supply water to nonresidents in the first place." Id.
-15-

Mr. Hai.k's Second Counterclaim raises the issue of whether SLC's refusal
to supply water to his Albion Basin lots violates his right to equal protection.
This issue was decided in Haik I, and in Haik II in the specific context of the post-

G

Haik I facts Mr. Haik again relies on.
In Haik I, the Haiks argued that "Salt Lake City's refusal to consent to

water service violates the Hai.k's right to equal protection under the law because
it irrationally treats them differently from other similarly situated property
owners." Haik II, Memorandum Opinion & Order at 20-21. The district court
rejected this argument, explaining:
_Salt Lake City has no legal duty to furnish water to users outside its
own city limits, be they usimilarly situated" or not. As an owner of
water rights, Salt Lake City's role in this instance is proprietary
rather than administrative. The equal protection yardstick is simply
not available to measure Salt Lake City's exercise of its contractual
power to consent pursuant to Paragraph 8 of the Water Supply
Agreement.

Id. at 21-22. The Tenth Circuit affirmed under both the United States and Utah
Constitution equal protection provisions, holding "Salt Lake City's actions were
reasonable."

Haik I, 1999 WL 190717 at *3-5.

It explained, "Line-drawing

inevitably requires that some persons who have an almost equally strong claim
to favored treatment be placed on different sides of the lines. That the line might
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have been drawn differently at some points is not a matter for judicial
consideration." Id. at *5 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The Haiks again raised an equal protection argument in Haik II. However,
because they alleged "new facts" in support of this claim, the Tenth Circuit held
~

that it was not barred by res judicata.

Haik 2012, 567 F. App'x at 632

("Hypothetically at least, the Hai.ks' new allegations could make out an equalprotection violation where none had occurred before."). Nevertheless, it rejected
the claim on its merits:
[T]he Haiks have not alleged differential treatment that states a
class-of-one equal-protection claim. We have little forgiveness for
this since we expressly considered several things unique about the
Haiks' situation in Haik I - including the location of their property,
their desired use, and their limited contractual rights. The current
complaint does not even attempt to allege facts that might lead us to
believe that the new water recipients are similar to them in any of
these respects.

Id. at 632-33.
Mr. Haik's Third Counterclaim, seeking a declaration of his due process

rights, turns on the existence of a protectable property interest. Whether Mr.
Haik has such a property interest was decided in Haik I and again in Haik II.
Indeed, in Haik II, the Tenth Circuit held Mr. Haik's due process claims were
vJ>

barred by issue preclusion because the protectable property interest issue had
been decided in the previous case. Haik II, 567 F. App'x at 628-31.
-17-

In Haik I, the Tenth Circuit held that the Haiks' taking claim, asserted
under both the Utah Constitution and the United States Constitution, failed
II

because they did not have a protectable interest in property that was taken or
damaged by Alta's denial of a building permit."

G,

1999 WL 190717 at *7.

11

Specifically, the Tenth Circuit held that mere expectation of municipal water

G;J

service in the future is not a legal right that constitutes property subject to
taking." Id.

In Haik II, the Tenth Circuit held that its prior holding on the taking claim
was sufficient to bar the Haiks' due process claims under the doctrine of issue
preclusion. 567 F. App'x at 628-31. It nevertheless went on to consider whether
the approval of SLC's change applications conferred upon the Haiks a
protectable property intere·st not yet in existence at the time of the first decision.

Id. at 629-31. The Tenth Circuit held that it did not: /.(The change applications
did not alter anyone's obligations and they certainly did not give the Haiks a
protected property interest or 'legitimate claim of entitlement' to more water."

Id. at 630. Mr. Haik's citation to Utah's Municipal Land Use, Development, and
Management Act (R. 2780,

,r 127), has no effect on this

determination, as it does

not even purport to create protectable property interests.
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G)

In his Fourth Counterclaim, Mr. Haik seeks a declaration that SLC's water
rights a16846 (57-10015) and a16844 (57-10013) are invalid in light of SLC's
failure to put the water to the full beneficial use identified in the change
applications-namely, its failure to provide water to the Albion Basin. Although
~

the precise authority for such a claim is unclear,7 the issue raised in the Fourth
Counterclaim was decided in Haik IL

There, the Tenth Circuit held that

"[n]othlng about [the change application] process requires the successful
applicant to perfect or to use the water in the manner approved." 567 F. App'x at

629.
Each of Mr. Haik's First through Fourth Counterclaims turns on issues that
have previously been litigated and decided against him, in some instances twice.
They are therefore barred by issue preclusion. (The Fifth Counterclaim, as will
be discussed below, is barred by claim preclusion.)

The Fourth Counterclaim appears to be a collateral attack on the State
Engineer's approval of the change applications. The only avenue to raise such a
challenge to the approval of SLC's change applications is a judicial review action
pursuant to Utah Code Section 73-3-14 and Utah's Administrative Procedures
Act.
7
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2.

Issue (e), the overarching issue Mr. Haik seeks
to litigate through the counterclaims, was
decided against Mr. Haik in Haik II.

In addition to the above-identified issues, which are specific to the First
through Fourth individual counterclaims, there is a common issue underlying
Mr. Haik' s counterclahns: "whether Utah Constitution XI, §6 [sic], is properly

interpreted to give property owners a constitutionally protected right to water
when a change application is approved designating their subdivision as a
permissible place of use of water." (R. 2757-58,

,r 9.)

The change applications to

which Mr. Haik refers are SLCs change applications a16844 and a16846. This
issue is the overarching issue that Mr. Haik seeks to relitigate in this case. While
not tied to a specrric counterclaim, Mr. Haik is barred from doing so because it is
the precise issue that was decided against him in Haik II.

In that case, the Hai.ks "argue[d] that the change applications," a16844 and
al 6846, "show that water is available and should be provided to them." Haik II,
2013 WL 968141 at *6.

They further argued "that, by failing to disclose or

intentionally withholding information about the change applications, Defendants
engaged in all sorts of malfeasance." Id. The district court explained, "in order
for any of Plaintiffs' claims to succeed, Plaintiffs must show that they are entitled
to water and that Defendants have refused to provide water to which they are
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~

entitled."

Id.

In other words, the Haiks had to show that SLC had "an

obligation" "to supply water" to their Albion Basin lots- the same thing they
argue in the present case. (See R. 2758,

,r 14.)

In its Memorandum Order and Decision on the defendants' motion to
dismiss in Haik II, the District of Utah explained,

• c.\

Viii

Unfortunately for Plaintiffs, they cannot make [the required]
showing [that they are entitled to water] .... The city ... declined to
provide water based on the 1963 Agreement and to further its
interest in the protection of the watershed.
Plaintiffs point to the change applications to rebut the reasons
put forth by ... Salt Lake City, but Plaintiffs have failed to provide
any allegations that the change applications entitle them to water.
While the change applications may show some future ability for Salt Lake
City to provide water to fhe Albion Basin Subdivision, there is no
obligation to do so . ...
Based on this simple fact, all of Plaintiffs' claims fail ....

Haik II, 2013 WL 968141 at *6 (emphasis added).
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed.

In doing so, it held that "the

change applications did not require Salt Lake City to supply water to the Haiks."

Haik II, 567 F. App'x at 636.

,.,[A]t most, the approved change applications

empowered Salt Lake City to supply water to the Haiks' lots." Id. at 629 (internal
quotation marks omitted, emphasis added). "The city's ability to supply water"
does not" amount[] to an obligation to do so." Id.
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Because Mr. Haik has previously litigated the issue of whether SLC's
change applications, which would allow SLC to serve water to his lots, impose a
constitutional obligation on it to do so, he is barred from relitigating that issuewhich is the overarching issue in this case-here.
B.

Claim preclusion bars the relitigation of Mr. Haik's
counterclaims because each of those claims was raised
or could have been raised in the two prior federal cases.

Claim preclusion applies when three requirements are satisfied: "(1) a
judgment on the merits in the earlier action; (2) identity of the parties or their
privies in both suits; and (3) identity of the cause of action in both suits." Yapp v.
Excel Corp., 186 F.3d 1222, 1226 (10th Cir. 1999). Mr. Haik does not dispute the

first two elements - that the two prior cases resulted in judgments on the merits
and that both he and SLC were parties to 1?oth prior cases. Rather, he argues that

~

SLC' s filing of the present suit constitutes a change in circumstance that prevents
application of claim preclusion (Appellant's Br. at 40-43).

This argument is

without merit.
The Tenth Circuit "has adopted the transactional approach of the
Restatement (Second) of Judgments in determining what constitutes identity of
the causes of action." Yapp, 186 F.3d at 1227. Under this approach, "'a claim
arising out of the same transaction, or series of connected transactions as a
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previous suit, which concluded in a valid and final judgment, will be precluded."

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). ,.,.What constitutes the same transaction or
i;;;

series of transactions is to be determined pragmatically, giving weight to such
considerations as whether the facts are related in time, space, origin, or

~

motivation, whether they form a convenient trial unit, and whether their
treatment as a unit conforms to the parties' expectations or business
understanding or usage." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

In the district court, Mr. Haik conceded that his First, Second, and Third
Counterclaims had been raised in one or more of the two prior federal cases.

(R. 6186-95, 6204-05.) His Fourth and Fifth Counterclaims, seeking declarations
that water rights a168558 (57-10015) and a16844 (57-10013) are invalid because
SLC has not put the water to the beneficial use identified in the change
applications and that SLC is subject to some public regulation, while not asserted
~

as separate claims in the prior cases, 8 arose out of the same transaction or set of
facts. This is illustrated by the Tenth Circuit's decision in Haik II.

While the Fourth Counterclaim was not previously asserted as a claim for
declaratory relief, the argument underlying it-that SLC's water rights are
invalid because SLC has not put the water to the full beneficial use identified in
its change applications-was previously litigated in Haik II, as discussed below.

8
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The Tenth Circuit began its decision by noting, "This appeal marks just
one chapter in an ongoing saga over the municipal supply of water to property
owned by Mark and Raymond Haik in Alta, Utah." Haik II, 567 F. App'x at 623.

G;;

It then briefly explained the facts giving rise to Haik I: the Haiks had ✓,purchased
four undeveloped lots in the Albion Basin Subdivision, located at the top of the

~

Little Cottonwood Canyon" and "wanted to develop their lots but were unable
to do so because of inadequate water supply." Id. When the Haiks "contacted
Alta to arrange for water service, [they] ~earned that Alta has no independent
rights to the water at issue." Id. at 624. Because the" Albion Basin Subdivision
falls outside the 1976 [Town of Alta] limits, ... Salt Lake City's pre-approval for
water service" is required. Id. "Yet when the Hai.ks inquired, Salt Lake City
declined to consent to the extension of water service to their lots." Id. This led
the Hai.ks to sue the Town of Alta and SLC, "asserting equal-protection claims
against both municipalities" and challenging "Salt Lake City's refusal to consent"
to the Town of Alta serving the Albion Basin lots. Id. ,.1The district court rejected
the Hai.ks' claims on summary judgment," and the Tenth Circuit affirmed. Id. at
624-25.
The Tenth Circuit then addressed the "new" facts giving rise to Haik II:
First, the Hai.ks based their claims on SLC change applications, which they
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alleged "resulted in two thlngs: (1) Salt Lake City could provide more than 400
gallons of water per day to each of the Hai.ks' lots; and (2) the Albion Basin
became part of Salt Lake City's water 'service area."' Id. at 625. Second, the
Haiks relied on a second round of permit denials that occurred after the change
~

applications were approved and, specifically, a letter from "Jeffry Niermeyer, the
Director of Salt Lake City's Department of Public Utilities, [which] told
permitting authorities that the Hai.ks were entitled to only 50 gallons of water per
day under the Little Cottonwood contract." Id. Third, the Haiks relied on their
alleged post-Haik I discovery "that Salt Lake City has been billing a number of
homes in the Albion Basin Subdivision for water in unmetered amounts," which
"shows that Salt Lake City is treating them differently from others within the
Albion Basin Subdivision without reason." Id. Finally, the Haiks relied on their
allegation "that Salt Lake City has repeatedly consented to supply water to

~

similarly situated people in the surrounding watershed canyons," some of which
predated Haik 1996 and some that did not. Id.
The same operative facts from Haik I and Haik II form the basis of Mr.
Haik's counterclaims. There is nothing new. The counterclaims stem from Mr.
Haik' s decades-long inability to receive water for his Albion Basin lots. (R. 2760,

,r 21; 2766, ,r,r 64-65.)

Mr. Haik argues that SLC's refusal to supply water to his
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Albion Basin lots is wrongful, just as he did in Haik I. And, as in Haik II, he relies
on (1) SLC's change applications a16844 and a16846 (R. 2756,

,r 122;

2781,

,r,r 129,

,r,I 10-12;

2799,

130); (2) the 50 gpd letter from Mr. Niermeyer (R. 2765,

GI

,r,r 55-57); (3) unmetered water sales to other lots in the Albion Basin Subdivision
(R. 2764,

,r 49;

2766,

iJ 63); and (4) SLC's alleged new water supply agreements

with others outside the municipal boundaries (R. 2767-68,

iJiJ 67, 69-72). A

review of Mr. Haik' s 132 factual allegations pled in support of his counterclaims
reveals only a retread of prior facts and claims and, importantly, no facts that
post-date the Haiks' 2012 Complaint or the Tenth Circuit's 2014 decision in Haik

II. Nothing has changed that would enable Mr. Haik to assert new claims based
on the same operative facts he has now been litigating for twenty years.

Mr. Haik nevertheless argues that there has been a change m
circumstances that would justify allowing him to relitigate his First, Second, and
Third Counterclaims and to assert his Fourth and Fifth Counterclaims. In doing
so, he relies on SLC's assertion of the Second Cause of Action in this case,
II

claiming that SLC' s allegation of injury to [its] water rights" is a "new event"
,.,that takes the counterclaims out of any preclusion." (Appellant's Br. at 41.)
SLC's assertion of the Second Cause of Action in this case is not a ,.,new fact" that
would enable Mr. Haik to litigate the counterclaims.
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11

Under federal res judicata law, a new action will be permitted only where
it raises new and independent claims, not part of the previous transaction, based on

... new facts." Hatch v. Boulder Town Council, 471 F.3d 1142, 1150 (10th Cir. 2006)
(emphasis in original). Here, there are no "new facts." SLC's assertion of a claim
~

for the adjudication of the nature, validity, and priority of Mr. Haik' s claimed
water right is not a "new fact." Nor does SLC's assertion of that claim turn on
any new facts.

SLC' s identified injury- interference with its various Little

Cottonwood Creek water rights-is based on facts that existed at the time of Haik

I and Haik II, namely, SLC' s long-held water rights. Indeed, two of those water
~

rights, a16844 (57-10013) and a16846 (57-10015), were the explicit basis of Mr.
Haik's assertion of claims in Haik II. Haik II, 567 F. App'x at 625-26. SLC's
assertion of the Second Cause of Action in this case merely provided Mr. Haik
with a new forum to assert his counterclaims-it does not give rise to a new
~

transaction or "new and independent claims" that previously did not exist.
Even if SLC' s assertion of the Second Cause of Action could be considered
a

II

new fact," the counterclaims are nevertheless barred by claim preclusion
II

because they fall within one .of several exceptions to the rule that only claims
related to the existing transaction are precluded."

Hatch, 471 F.3d at 1150.

·~

Applicable here is the exception of "where ... the object of the first proceeding
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was to establish the legality of the continuing conduct into the future." Id. at
1151 (internal quotation marks omitted). Through both Haik I and Haik II, Mr.
Hail< sought a declaration that SLC has an obligation to serve water to his Albion

G.;;

Basin lots and that its refusal to do so violates various of his constitutional rights.
He unquestionably sought to establish the legality, or illegality, of SLC's
"continuing conduct into the future." As this exception recognizes, allowing Mr.
Hail< to assert claims designed to obtain this same prospective relief every time
SLC claims impairment of its long-held Little Cottonwood Creek water rights is
antithetical to the principles of finality underlying the doctrine of res judicata.
Because Mr. Hai.k's counterclaims either admittedly were raised in one or
both of the two prior cases or arise out of the same transaction and thus could
have been r~ised, each of the elements of claim preclusion is satisfied.

C.

Mr. Haik's argument that decisions of the federal courts
can never have preclusive effect if the issue decided
turns on state law is without merit.

Mr. Haik additionally argues that neither issue preclusion nor claim

preclusion can bar the relitigation of his counterclaims because res judicata does
not apply to cases involving state law and state constitutional claims where the
prior decision was a federal decision. (Appellant's Br. at 43-47, 47-48, 49-50.) He
frames the question as whether "Federal courts [can] foreclose Utah State Court
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~

review of Federal interpretations of ... the Utah Constitution." (Appellant's Br.
at 43.) He also attempts to frame the same argument as a "lack of finality."
(Appellant's Br. at 49.)

In support of this argument, Mr. Haik relies upon the principle that "[t]his
~

court, not the United States Supreme Court, has the authority and obligation to
interpret Utah's constitutional guarantees, including the scope of due process,
and we owe federal law no more deference in that regard than we do sister state
interpretation of identical state language." State v. Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49,

,r 33,

162 P.3d 1106.
While a federal court's interpretation of a provision of the United States
Constitution does not bind this Court in interpreting an identical provision of the
Utah Constitution, that is not what is at issue here. Rather, the question here is
whether a final judgment in a federal court bars the parties to that case from
~

relitigating claims or issues that were or could have been raised and decided in
that case, whether they be Utah constitutional claims or otherwise. The answer
to that question is yes.
Utah courts have repeatedly held that claim preclusion bars the relitigation
of state law claims that have been previously litigated in federal court. See, e.g.,

McCarthy v. State, 1 Utah 2d 205, 265 P.2d 387, 389 (1953) ("The [state law] issue
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having been squarely presented and determined [in the federal court
proceeding], it is res judicata as between these parties."); Pride Stables v.

Homestead Golf Club, 2003 UT App 411,
preclusion applied where

11

,r 18,

82 P.3d 198 (holding claim

Gv

the parties fully litigated in the bankruptcy

proceeding the issue of whether an express contract existed," a matter of Utah

G:.i

law).
Mr. Haik offers no authority to support his position that a different rule

applies to claims under the Utah Constitution. This Court has, on at least two
occasions, considered whether a federal court decision on claims under the Utah
Constitution has claim preclusive effect. Nu-Med USA, Inc. v. 4Life Research, L. C.,
2008 UT 50,

,r 8, 190 P.3d 1264; Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 2003 UT 13, ,r 36, 73

P.3d 325. Although in both cases there was no preclusive effect, this was because
neither federal court decision was a final decision on the merits-not because, as
Mr. Haik contends, there is a categorical exclusion of such cases from the

doctrme of claim preclusion. Nu-Med, 2008 UT 50,

,r 8 (holding claim preclusion

did not apply because "the federal district court's voluntary dismissal was
without prejudice"); Snyder, 2003 UT 13,

,r,r 36-37 (holding claim preclusion did

not apply because the federal court declined to exercise supplemental
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jurisdiction over the state constitutional claims and dismissed them without
prejudice).
This Court has further held that where "plaintiffs failed to assert their state
claim [in a prior federal proceeding] when the federal court had the power to
~

adjudicate it with their federal claim, they are barred under the doctrine of res
judicata from litigating the issues in the instant action." Belliston v. Texaco, Inc.,
521 P.2d 397, 382 (Utah 1974).

Applying this principle, the Utah Court of

Appeals has routinely affirmed the dismissal of state claims where those claims
could and should have been litigated in a prior federal proceeding. 9 Thus, even
though Mr. Haik did not previously assert his Fourth or Fifth Counterclaim, he is
barred by claim preclusion from doing so here.

See, e.g., Bishop v. Inwest Title Serns., Inc., 2014 UT App 189, ,r 13, 336 P.3d 578
("Bishop could and should have asserted his claimed superior right under the
Warranty Deed-and his claims for damages flowing from that superior rightin conjunction with his quiet title claim against BANA and Boyce in
the federal action. Because he failed to do so, his present claims against BANA
and Boyce are barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion."); Hansen v. Bank of
N. Y. Mellon, 2013 UT App 132, ,r 15, 303 P.3d 1025 ("Because we conclude that ...
Hansen's [state law] claims in this case could have been brought in the federal
action, we hold that the district court correctly dismissed Hansen's claims as
being barred by res judicata."); Massey v. Bd. of Trustees of Ogden Area Community
Action Comm., Inc., 2004 UT App 27, ,r 12, 86 P.3d 120 ("Because Massey's
wrongful termination claim under state law stems from the same claim as the
section 1983 claim, Massey could and should have brought his state claims in the
prior [federal] suit." (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)).
9
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Mr. Haik also relies on Jensen v. Cunningham, 2011 UT 17, 250 P.3d 465. But

Jensen does not extend as far as Mr. Haik would have it reach-to hold that a
federal court's decision on a state law issue can never give rise to issue
preclusion.

In Jensen, this Court held that the U.S. District Court's grant of summary
judgment to the defendants on federal constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 did not collaterally estop the plaintiffs from asserting state constitutional

cla~ based on the same facts in a state court proceeding. 2011 UT 17,

,r 49.

There, the U.S. District Court had expressly declined to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' state constitutional claims and dismissed them
without making any findings with regard to those claims. 10 Id.

,r 39.

The grant of

summary judgment was thus limited to analysis of the plaintiffs' federal
constitutional claims, applying the federal framework for qualified immunity.
This Court held that type of "federal court determination that the material
undisputed facts do not give rise to a federal constitutional violation does not
preclude a state court from deciding whether those same facts will give rise to a
state constitutional violation."

Id.

,r 49.

That holding does not somehow

establish that a federal court's decision on a state constitutional claim (or state
10

This is presumably the reason that claim preclusion was not raised in Jensen.
-32-

~

common law claim) is deprived of issue preclusive effect. Indeed, in Jensen, this
Court acknowledged that where "an issue had been decided by the federal court
using the same standard that would be applied in state court, the plaintiff [i]s
precluded from relitigating that issue in state court." Id.

,r 42.

Thus, while it is clear that Utah courts need not defer to a federal court's
interpretation of the Utah Constitution or Utah law, there is no authority to
support Mr. Haik' s position that a federal court's ruling against a particular
party on a state law issue has no preclusive effect as to that party. To the contrary,
this Court has held that a federal court's decision on an issue of state law,
applying state law, does, in fact, have issue preclusive effect.

Jensen v.

Redevelopment Agency of Sandy City, 951 P.2d 735, 737 (Utah 1997) ("The Tenth
Circuit held that under Utah law plaintiffs did not have a property interest in the
information it supplied to the City .... The Tenth Circuit's ruling that plaintiffs
did not have any property interest in the information it disclosed to the City and
RDA is res judicata of that issue in this action."). Haik I and Haik II involve
~

precisely such decisions.
Mr. Hai.k's argument that the federal court decisions in Haik I and Haik II

cannot give rise to res judicata is frivolous. To the extent it can be read as a
request that this Court adopt a new rule exempting from the doctrine of res
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judicata federal court decisions in cases involving state law claims and issues, the
Court should refuse to do so. Such a rule would erode the very purposes of the
doctrine of res judicata - "to protect litigants from the burden of relitigating an

~

identical issue with the same party or his [or her] privy and to promote judicial
economy by preventing needless litigation," State ex rel. S.D.C., 2001 UT App 353,

~·

,r 12, 36 P .3d 540.
II.

THE COURT LACKS JURISDICTION OVER ANY APPEAL
OF THE DISTRICT COURT'S DENIAL OF MR. HAIK'S
MOTION TO DISMISS.

Although not included in his Statement of Issues, Mr. Haik has argued that
the district court "clearly erred in failing to dismiss the suit" in response to Mr.
Hai.k's motion to dismiss. (Appellant's Br. at 51.) He has further included in his
Statement of Facts a discussion of SLC' s and the District's asserted injury in
support of the Second Cause of Action, concluding that the "Amended Petition
'does not expressly allege a reasonable probability of future injury."' (Id. at 1519.) While less than clear, it appears that through this appeal, Mr. Haik seeks
review of the district court's denial of his motion to dismiss. To the extent he
does, the Court lacks jurisdiction to consider that decision.
This Court "does not have jurisdiction ov~ ..~. appeal unless it is taken
from a final judgment, Utah R. App. P. 3(a), or qualifies for an exception to the
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final judgment rule." Loffredo v. Holt, 2001 UT 97,

,r 10, 37 P.3d 1070.

The district

court's denial of Mr. Hai.k's motion to dismiss is not a final judgment-it did not
"end the controversy between the litigants," id.

,r 12, but rather allowed SLC and

the District to continue to pursue their Second Cause of Action.
The district court's denial of Mr. Haik' s motion to dismiss further does not
satisfy any of the exceptions to the final judgment rule. "[O]rders and judgments
that are not final can be appealed if such appeals are statutorily permissible, if
the appellate court grants permission under rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, or if the trial court expressly certifies them as final for purposes of
appeal under rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure."
Valencia, 2000 UT 50,

,r 12, 5 P.3d 649.

Bradbury v.

None of those circumstances applies here.

To the extent Mr. Haik has sought review of the district court's denial of
his motion to dismiss, the Court lacks jurisdiction. The Court must dismiss any
~

such portion of Mr. Haik' s appeal and refuse to consider his arguments on SLC' s
and the District's standing to assert the Second Cause of Action and the merits of
the claims asserted therein.
CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, SLC requests that this Court affirm the district
court's dismissal of Mr. Haik's counterclaims.
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DATED this_ day of October, 2016.
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISIONr
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)
)
)
)

RAYMOND A. HAIK and
MARK C. HAIK,
Plaintiffs,

)
)
)

vs.

-

Civil No. 2:96-cv-7321

MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER

THE TOWN OF ALTA, a political subdivision )
of the State of Utah, and SALT LAKE CITY )
CORPORATION, a political subdivision of the )
State of Utah,

)

)
)

Defendants.

*********
Plaintiffs Raymond A. Haile and Mark C. Haile ('1Haiks") commenced this action to redress
an alleged denial of equal protection of the law by the Town of Alta ("Alta"). The Haiks own
unimproved parcels of land located within the ~bion Basin and within Alta's municipal limits.
They contend that Alta owes a legal duty to extend municipal water service to their lots,
notwithstanding the terms of the Water Supply Agreement between Alta and co-defendant Salt
Lake City requiring Alta to obtain Salt Lake City's approval prior to extending additional water

service to private landowners. Without municipal y,rater service, the Hailes further assert, they are
unable to obtain the building permits required to construct dwellings on their lots. If Alta's refusal
to extend water service is somehow sustained, the Hruks contend that they are then entitled to just

compensation for a "taking of their property.
11

/A

On November 27, 1996., plaintiffs filed a Motion for Partial Stµnmary Judgment (dkt. no. ·

17). On Janumy 22, 1997, defendan~-~~
:,: :-, ••,, i

;•V

~~- s:~te City filed their memoranda ✓

l =~

,~

-' •1;,,
1~~I

n

r )

~

·~
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opposition to plaintiffs' motion (dkt. nos. 19, 22), as well as their own cross motions for summary
judgment (dkt. nos. 18, 21), accompanied by supporting affidavits (dlct. nos. 20, 23, 24). Alta
also filed a motion to strike certain exhibits annexed to plaintiffs' motion papers as
unauthenticated documents (dkt. no. 25). The Hailes filed their response/reply memoranda on
March 19, 1997 (dkt. nos. 31, 32, 33), and on April 9, 1997, Alta and Salt Lake City filed their
reply memoranda (dkt. nos. 34, 36), together with a supplemental affidavit (dkt. no. 35).
On April 25, 1997, these motions were heard by the court. At that time, the court
requested the submission of additional data concerning water availability and took all motions
under advisement In the weeks thereafter, the parties filed a series of papers-submission and
objections, reply and "sur-reply!' (dkt. nos. 41, 42, 43, 44, 46, 50, 52).

Having reviewed the motions, memoranda, affidavits, submissions, objections, replies anq
sur-replies, and having considered the arguments of counsel, the court now rules as follows:
Factual Background 1

Albion Basin is located above the Alta and Snowbird ski resorts at the top of Little .
Cottonwood Canyon, east of Salt Lake City, and com.prises part of the watershed relied upon by
Salt Lake City and other Salt Lake Valley communities for their culinary water supply.

In 1963, Canyonlands, Inc., an apparent predecessor in interest to plaintiffs, entered into a
contract with the Little Cottonwood Water Company which promised the availability of not more
than 50 gallons per day to users in each of not more than 35 ca.bins to be constructed in the

Albion Basin Subdivision #1.

The parties' respective statements of facts recount this history in detail, supported by affidavits and
buttressed by hwidrcds of pages of exhibits. The following offers only a brief summaiy of the stated facts.
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Prior to 1971, land ownership in the Albion Basin was relatively free of county zoning
regulations. In 1966, Salt Lake Cmmty had adopted a unifonn zoning ordinance governing

unincorporated areas of the county, and in November 1971, the county for the first time sought to
limit building in the Albion Basin through an amendment to the 1966 ordinance. The amendment
provided that no dwelling could be erected on less than fifty acres ofland. This amendment
followed on the heels of applications for building permits that had been filed by Albion Basin
Subdivision landowners who wished to construct four-plex housing units on their lots.
Marvin and Renee Melville, together with other Albion Basin Subdivision landowners,
challenged the amendment in district cowt as being arbitrary, capricious, and unlawfully enacted.
The first time around, the Meivilles prevailed; in 1975, the Utah Supreme Court struck down the
1971 amendment, holding that "when a zoning regulation is to be applied to unwned land, it must

be done after notice has been given four times by publication and not under the guise of an
amendment." Melville v. Salt Lake County, 536 P.2d 133 (Utah 1975).
On August 4, 1975, Salt Lake County enacted another zoning ordinance, this one
restricting construction in the Albion Basin to one single family cabin per subdivision lot. In May
of 1976, a second trial was conducted in the Melville litigation on the plaintiffs' fourth cause of
action see~ writs of mandamus compelling the issuance of building pennits for the plaintiffs'
proposed four-plex units. Pl~tiffs did no~ prevail in the district court because they failed to
show that any company or person, including Marvin Melville, had the right to use sufficient water
in Little Cottonwood Canyon to supply the 400 gallons per day per unit that was-~quired by the

Salt Lake Co1:IDty Board of Health oefore a building permit could issue. On appeal, the Utah
Supreme Court affinne~ concluding that u[a]t most plaintiffs have proved that they may have a
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right to 50 gallons 9f water per. unit constructed, which does not meet the County Board of

Healtb.1s requirement of 400 gallons per unit per day." Melville v. Salt Lake· County, 570 P.2d
687, 689 (Utah 1977) (~mphasis in original). 2
Meanwhile, on August 12, 1976, Salt Lake City entered into the INTERGOVERN-

1v1ENTAL AGREE1vfENT-WATER SUPPLY AGREEMENT SALT LAKE CITY TO ALTA
CITY ("Water Supply Agreement11). Reciting that Salt Lake City "owns and/or controls the

major portion of the primary waters of Little Cottonwood Canyon for the use and benefit of Salt
Lake City residents, some of which, at this time, can be made available to Alta," the Water Supply
Agreement provides that Salt Lake City ~'agrees to make available to Alta for its use, as
hereinafter described, the normal flow of raw, tmtreated water, not to exceed 265,000 gallons pef
day. 11 Id at ,rt. Alta's "use, as hereinafter described,u includes the following express limitation:

8.
It is expressly understood and agreed that said pipelines shall not be
extended to or supply water to any properties or facilities not within the present
city limits of Alta without the prior written consent of [Salt Lake] City.

If!. at ,I 8. It is uncontroverted that in 1976, Albion Basin Subdivision# I lay beyond the city
limits of Alta Moreover, the Wat.er Supply Agreement recited that 11Alta recognizes [Salt Lake]
City's need to protect its ~rshed and specifically agrees to be bound by and comply with all
City water ordinances, applicable County ordinances, Salt Lake City-County Board of Health
regulations and applicable state law." Id at ,T 12. It also appears unconiroverted that in 1976,
11

applicable County ordinances" limited construction in the Albion Basin Subdivision #1 to one
2

The court also concluded that plaintiffs failed to show that they had lawfully appropriated the water

flowing from a spring flowing from the portal of the old Alta-Helena M"me, located on Marvin Melville's Albion Basin
property, and likewise failed to establish that they owned the spring waters as "percolating water"arising on the Melville
property under Riordan v. Westwood, 11S Utah 215, 203 P .2d 922, 929, 930 (1949). The spring produced water at a rate
. of 20 gallons per min~ which a health department official testified was adequate to supply the proposed·four-plcxes with
the required 400 gallons of water per unit per day. 570 P.2d at 688-89.
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single family cabin per subdivision lot, which the Board of Health required to be supplied with
400 gallons of water per day as a precondition to issuing a building permit
Following the Utah Supreme Court's denial of the mandamus remedy in 1977, Marvin
Melville made repeated requests to Salt Lake City for water to supply his Albion B~in property.
Those requests were consistently refused, and it appears that Melville never succeeded in
obtaining a building permit for his Albion Basin property or commencing construction of the
proposed dwellings.

In 1981, Alta undertook to annex the Albion Basin Subdivision, which was accomplished
by an August 20, 1981 resolution following a July 16, 1981 public hearing.3 Thereafter, Alta
conditioned issuance of building permits in the Albion Basin upon "approval of all uses, regardless

of the size or number of units" given "in writing by the Salt Lale~ City-County Health Department,
who shall certify as to the adequacy of the culinary water system and the sewage sys~m." The
approval of culinary water and sewer systems "shall be in accordance with the regulations of the

Salt Lake City-County .Health Department and the Utah State Division of Health. 11 Town of Alta
Uniform Zoning Ordinance,§ 22-7-8(2) (1989).4 The regulations referred to by the Alta
ordinance continue to require the availability of 400 gallons of water per day per housing unit to
be constructed. See Utah Ad.min. Code§ R309-105-1 (1.2.6) {1997).

In 1983, Alta requested an amendment to the Water Supply Agreement, authorizing an
ex.tension of water service to the newly annexed Albion Basin properties. Salt Lake City,

3

Annexation was supported by, among others, Marvin Melville. See Affidavit of Mayor Wtlliam H.
Levitt, dated January 21, 1997 (dkl no. 23), at 4i 22. Melville now avers that he "agreed to the annexation on tlic belief
that Alta would provide all city services to my property." Affidavit of Marvin Melville, dated March 5, 1997, at15.

Id at 126.
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however, declined to consent to the proposed B;II1endment In 1988, however, Salt Lake City
adopted a Watershed Management Plan and consented to Alta's use of water for snowmaking

within Alta's city limits, ~hich by 1988 included land within the Albion Basin area.

In 1988, Alta, Salt Lake City, and other government entitle$ commenced discussion of
acquiring private lands in the Albion Basin area for public use, and began developing acquisition
strategies toward that end. Salt Lake City also entered into discussions with the Little
Cottonwood Water Company in 1988 that culminated in Salt Lake City succeeding to the
company's obligations under various water supply contracts, including the I 963 agreement
affecting Albion Basin Subdivision #1, following the dissolution of the company in 1994.
In April 1991, the Salt Lake _City Council adopted a Watershed Ordinance, § 17.04.020.A,
B(l) of the Salt ~e city Qrclinances, which, inter alia, prohibits the city from entering into any

·G
new water sales agreements or expanding any existing agreements, with three exceptions:
(a) water sales for residential use to property owners with a spring on the property;
(b) water sales to governmental entities for use on land they own or lease; or

(c) water sales for snowmaking and fire protection in certain cases.

In 1992, pursuant to the 1991 ordinance, Salt Lake City agreed to supply water to the U.S. Forest
Service for recreational purposes at several locations, including the Albion Basin campground. In
1993, Salt Lake City gave consent to use of additional water for snowmaking by the Alta Ski Lifts
Company. In 1995, Salt Lake City also consented to the extension of Alta's municipal water lines
to an expanded Alpenglow lodge facility, which purportedly falls within the 197ocity limits of
Alta and therefore within the terms of the 1976 Water Supply Agreement

In November, 1992, Alta prepared a General Plan ·for the Town of Alta. The General Plan
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identifies Albion Basin as a "high priority" area for the acquisition by Alta of privately-owned

lands and recommends that "no future development be allowed in areas not served by a public
sewer system," presumably including Albion Basin Subdivision #1. In September, 1994, Alta
executed a Memorandum of Understanding with the U.S. Forest Service acknowledging that "a

majority of the private land which exists in Albion Basin is presently undeveloped," that
"development rights are affected by current laws and ordinances," and that 11 some properties lack
water rights necessary for development," and endorsing "the public acquisition of land in the
Albion Basin."
A month later, in October 1994, the Hailes stepped into this milieu by purchasing Lots 25,
26, 29 and 30 of Albion Basin Subdivision #1 from Marvin Melville.
In a November 29, 1994 response to Raymond Haik's written inquiry concerning water
and sewer services, ~ta informed Haile that Alta does not provide water and sewer services to the
Albion Basin Subdivision and referred him to the Salt Lake City Department of Public Utilities,

Water Division. Upon inquuy by the Hailes, Salt Lake City in 1996 declined to consent to the
extension of Al~ water pipes and water supply to the Hailes' lots, relying on Paragraph 8 of the
1976 Water Supply Agreement and the 1991 Watershed Ordinance, § 17.04.020 of ~e Salt Lake
City Ordinances.
In October, 1997, three years after their purchase, the Hailes continue to own Lots 25, 26,
29 and 30 of Albion Basin Subdivision #1, and continue to be unable to build on those lots
because of the lack of culinary.water supply that remains~ legal prerequisite to tli;.construction
of dwellings on the property.
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The Haiks' Equal Protection Claims Against Alta
As the Ninth Circuit pointed out in Lockary v.

Kayfetz, 917 F.2d 1150 (9th Cir. 1990),

:<;,

The interest in water for real estate development is not a fundamental right Bank
ofAmerica Nat'[ Trust and Savings Ass'n v. Summer/and County Water Dist., 767
F.2d 544,548 (9th Cir. 1985). Unless a classification trammels fundamental
personal rights or implicates a suspect classification, to meet constitutional
challenge the law in question needs only some rational relation to a legitimate state
interest. City ofNew Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303-04, 96 S.Ct. 2513,
2516-17, 49 L.Ed.2d 51 I (1976)....
However, the rational relation test will not sustain conduct by state officials
that is malicious, irrational or plainly arbitrary....

917 F.2d at 1155 (citation omitted). In this case, the Hailes contend that Alta, by refusing their
requests to extend water service to the Hailes' Albion Basin properties, has acted in arbitrary and
irrational fashion and has thereby denied the Hailes equal protection of the laws. Toe Hailes'
contention presupposes the existence of a legal duty on the part of Al~ to supply water to
property owners such as the Haiks, as well as the legal and physical capacity to do so.
~

The Municipal Duty to Supply Water _

In Rose v. Plymouth Town, 110 Utah 358, 173 P.2d 285 (1946), the Utah Supreme ~ourt
held that mandamus did not lie to compel town authorities to extend their municipal water system
to plaintiff's residence located within the town's geographical limits where such extension could be
accomplished only at considerable expense. 11Unless the town authorities are shown to have failed

to exercise judgment or discretion such that a refusal to extend the water system would be
unreasonable tl)eir decision is :final" 173 P.2d at 287. In dictum_, Chief Justice Larson observed,

If this were a case where the town authorities had refused to connect the ptaintiff's
residence to a main already laid or if the plaintiff had :financed the cost of the
extension and agreed to accept water at the prescribed rates in payment therefor,
the remedy might lie, because the writ would then be for the purpose of compelling
the town to perform a duty, a minis(erial act about which it would have no
-8-
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discretion. But such is not this suit The effort here is to compel the extension of
the water system a considerable distance under circumstances which call for reason
and judgment and the exercise of discretion and are not ministerial.
Id (emphasis added).
Child v. City ofSpanish Fork, 538 P.2d 184 (Utah 1975), rejected a claim that a

municipalitys requirement tha~ landowners in a newly annexed area convey shares of water in
exchange for annexation was arbitrary, unreasonable, and a denial of equal protection. Agreeing
with the district court that the requirement "represented prudence in planning for the City's
needs," the Utah Supreme Court upheld the requirement as being wholly within the city's powers

and not "in any degree unreasonable or arbitrary," and rejected plaintiffs' assertion that the city
should fund the acquisition of additional water through a bond issue. 538 P.2d at 186-87.
Rejecting the new annexees' claim of unequal treatment as comp~ed to existing residents who
made no conveyance of water rights, the court observed that "different treatment of individuals
does not necessarily violate tht: equal protection of the laws assurances. 11 Persons may be treated
differently by the law 11 if the classifications have a reasonable relationship to a proper and lawful
purpose, and if all pe~ons within the same class are treated equally." Id at 187. The Child court
concluded that "the treatment of all of the plaintiffs as a class seeking annexation is for a proper
and lawful ptupose; and ..• all of the persons in that class are treated equally. 11 Id
Similarly, Thompson v. Salt Lake City1 724 P.2d 958 (Utah 1986), involved another effort
to compel a municipality to provide water service. By ordinance, Salt Lake City conditioned

water service upon agreement by the landowner to be responsible for payment fotall water
provided to his property. Less~es sued to obtain water service where their lessor refused to sign
such an agreement, asserting that the city had a duty to provide water service and that the
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condition requiring landowner agreement was "arbitrary, unreasonable, and discriminatory," and
denied equal protection of the laws. Once again the Utah Supreme Court denied relief, holding
that although they are ~uthorized to provide water service, municipalities are not public utilities
and do not "have a legal duty to provide water service to all members of the public .... " The
court upheld the ordinance on the grounds that (I) the ordinance tracked a state statute
authorizing municipalities to require property owners to be responsibJe for payment for water
service (see Utah Code Ann. § 10-7-10 (1973)); (2) the ordinance placed "all property. owners in
the same class and treat[e~] them equally"; (3) the ordinance imposed the payment obligation on
"the most logical and reasonable persons to bear that responsibility" -and thus represented "the
mo.st effective means of insuring payment for water service"; and (4) the ordinance did not
discriminate against tenants. 'The ordinance therefore encompasses a legitimate purpose and
objective and does not create an unconstitutional classification to achieve that objective." 724
P.2dat 959,960.

At the outset, the Hailes acknowledge that, consistent with Thompson, Alta was not and is
not designated as a public utility/ and "[h]ence, it does not have a legal duty to provide water
service to all members of the public." Thompson, 724 P.2d at 959. Yet n[e]ven a:municipality,"
the Hai.ks submit, "cannot arbitrarily choose to supply water to certain residents while denying it
to

others.

rt

6

Rose, Thompson, and Child, the Hailes assert, "make clear that a municipality may refuse

s

Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summacy Judgment, filed November 26, 1996
(dkt. no. 15) ("Pltfs1 Mem. "), at 6.
6

Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, and Memorandum in
Opposition to Defendants' Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment and Defendant Town of Alta1s Motion to Strike, filed
March 19, 1997 (dkt. no. 32) ('1Pltfs' Reply/Opp. Mem. (Alta)")i at 9.
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water service to residents for.economic reasons. No such economic justification for refusing
water service to the Haiks exists here, however. 11 Pltfs' Reply/Opp. Mem. (Alta) at 10. The Hailes
urge that they remain entirely willing and able to fund the extension of water lines to their
property, thus eliminating the kind of economic impediment that justified municipal inaction in

. Rose, Thompson, and Child. -11[W]here the Hailes have offered to pay the costs of the extension,
and Alta has available sufficient water, 11 the Hailes conclude, "Alta's obligation to provide water to
the Haik$' lots is 'a ministerial act about which it (has] no discretion."' Pltfs1 Reply/Opp. Mem.

(Alia) at 10-11 (quoting Rose, 173 P.2d at 2&7).
Yet it does not follow from Rose, Thompson, or Child that economic considerations are
the only valid reasons that may justify ~eclining to extend municipal water service to particular
property. The Hailes' argument presupposes that 11 Alta has available sufficient water,'' which in
this case turns on considerations of legal right and the exercise of lawful power.
While Utah law empowers municipalities to "construct, maintain and operate waterworks 11
by statute, see Utah Code Ann.§ 10-8-14 (1996), a town does not gain any entitlement to

ownership or use of any water simply by yirtue of the town's existence. Counties, cities and
towns have no "reserved right' to enough water to supply the needs of their constituents. Water
to be supplied through a municipal water system must be acquired through lawful means as
outlined in the statute. See Utah Code Ann.§ 10-7-4 (1996); Child, 538 P.2d at 186 (consistent

with the statute, a city may acquire water resources by purchase, lease1 condemnation, gift,

. assignment, "or even by prescriptive use or easement11).
Ownership ofland, ~th~ut more, likewise does not entitle a private landowner to use

water that flows across, under or nearby that land. Instead, the Legislature decreed long ago that
·..;)
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"[a]ll waters in this state, whether above or under the ground are hereby declared to be the
property of the public •.•. 11 Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-1 (1989). As the Utah Supreme Court
explained in the second Melville opinion, "No one owns or can own water in this state .... One
can only acquire the right to use the water. One's right to use the water is measured by the
amount he puts to beneficial use without interfering with another person's prior right to the use of
the water. '1 570 P.2d at 688. In Utah, rights in land and rights to water arise separately and are
legally distinct from each other. Ownership of one does not necessarily confer a right to the
other. A municipality, like a private landowner, must acquire its water in the manner prescribed
by law. See Mt.·Olivet Cem. Ass'n v. Salt Lake City, 65 Utah 193,235 P. 876,879 (1925)

(neither the city's ownership of land in Emigration Canyon nor its exercise of regulatory police
power established proprietary right to use water).
B. Alta's "Capacity" to Supply Water
The waters of Little Cottonwood Canyon have been subject to extensive prior
appropriation for years, indeed, for many years before the events concerning the Albion Basin
transpired as recounted above. See generally Little Cottonwood Water Co. v. Sandy Cfty, 123
Utah 242,258 P.2d 440 (1953) (surface waters of Little Cottonwood Canyon fully appropriated;

..

groundwater appropriation disputed as impairing surface water flow). Nothing in the Haiks1
pleadings suggests that any unappropriated water remains available near Alta that Alta may now

put to beneficial use by extending its water system to the Haiks1 Albion Basin lots. 7

Nor do the Hailes suggest the availability of any water that may be acquired by Alta through
condemnation. It appears th.at Salt Lake City has acquired the water rights belonging to the former Little Cottonwood
Water Co., which otherwise might have been acquired by Alta through eminent domain proceedings. Cf. North Salt Lake
v. St. Joseph Water & Irr. Ca., 118 Utah 600t 223 P.2d 577 (1950) (municipality may acquire water rights by eminent
domain from entity 1hat provides public water service).
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At this point, Salt Lake City-not Alta-appears to hold all the cards where water in Little
Cottonwood Canyon is concerned. Indeed, as successor to the Little Cottonwood Water
Company, Salt Lake City even has control of the water (50 gallons per day) to be supplied to
dwellings in the Albion Basin Subdivision# 1 under the company's 1963 agreement 8
Besides purchasing the Albion Basin lots from Marvin Melville, the Hailes stepped into

Melville's shoes in another respect: notwithstanding the physical "availability" of sufficient water
to support the construction of dwellings on their lots, they can establish no right under Utah's
prior appropriation system of water rights that entitles either themselves or the Town of Alta to

use that water for that purpose. Alta's "right" to use 265,000 gallons of water per day flows from
its contractual agreement with that premier prior appropriator, Salt Lake City, who expressly

conditioned Alta's right upon Salt Lake Citys retained power to consent-or refuse to consent-to
extensions of Alta's municipal water system beyond Alta's 1976 geographical limits.
It may be true that Alta has told others that it has "the capacity to supply water for 34
residential connections in addition to the approximately 190 connections it curre~tly services,"
(Pltfs1 Mem. at xii 145 (emphasis added)), but this physical capacity does not translate into the

legal capacity-the right or power-to authorize or support such ~e, at least outside of Alta1s

..1976 geographical limits, because Alta's legal capacity to supply water remains circ~scribed at
its source, the 1976 Water Supply Agreement.

In the first instance, then, Alta cannot supply water to tlie Hailes beyond that which is
11

available 11 under its 1976 Water Supply Agreement with Salt Lake _City. Water is not available to

8

Nothing in the present record suggests that Salt Lake City has forfeited any of its rights to water in Little
Cottonwood Canyon fornonuse. See Nephi CiJy v. Hansen, 719 P.2d at 673, 674-76 (Utah 1989) (citys nonconsumptive
water rights forfeited where rights were 11 unused for about thirty yearsn).
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the Hailes under the Water Supply Agreement absent Salt Lake Citys consent to an extension of
service beyond Alta's 19,76 limits. Where Salt Lake City withholds its consent, Alta has no legal
right to extend water service to ·the Hailes.
II. Alta's 1981 Annexation of Albion Basin

The Hailes cite to Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-40 I (4), which states that as a matter of
legislative policy, "areas annexed to municipalities in accordance with appropriate standards
should receive the services pr9vided by the annexing municipality .•. as soon as possible
following the annexation, 11 fil:ld to § 10~2-417(3), w~ch provides that municipalities "shall not
annex tenitory ... without the ability and without the intent to benefit the annexed area by
rendering munfoipal services in the annexed area"
Paragraphs 5 and 6 of Alta's July 16, 1981 Policy Declaration referred to the intended
availability of police and fire :I'rotection, avalanche warning, sewer dump station and planning and

zoning services. Yet the Policy Declaration makes no express commitment to extend Alta's water
system to the Hailes' propei;tr or to supply water notwithstanding the terms of the Water Supply
Agreement Paragraph 7 of the Policy Declaration simply specifies that "[a]ny sewer and water

improvements required by ~ e develop~en4 according to the established policy of the Town,"

will be paid for by the owner or developer affected, talcing into account the possibility of future
water availability. Affidavit of Mayor William H. Levitt, dated January 21, 1997 (dkt no. 23), at
,r20.
As far as § I Q..2-411(3) is concerned, this plainly was not a case of annexation solely to

generate revenue. Anticipated revenue was minimal. The servi_ces referred to in the Policy
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Declaration were provided.9 CompOl'e Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. City ofNorth Salt Lake, 711 P .2d
228 (Utah 1985) (where it is uncontroverted that city annexed property solely to gain revenue
with r•no ability to render services that would benefit" the annexed property, annexation properly

held unlawful under§ 10-2-41 =7(3)). Sections 10-2-401(4).and 10-2-417(3) do not specify which
municipal services the annexing authority must have the ability and intent to provide for a lawful
annexation to occur; nor does the balance of the Local Boundary Com.missions Ac~§§ 10-2-401

et seq., expressly require that water. or sewer services be furnished to all annexed property, or that
municipalities act immediately _to further the development of annexed areas. 10
Apart from case and statutory authority, the Hailes point to no express contractual

agreement with Alta, made either in the context of annexation or otherwise, entitling the Hailes to
municipal water service. Instead, the Haiks assert that Alta "became obligated to provide water in
the Albion Basin by its own statements at the time of annexation." Pltfs' Reply/Opp. Mem. (Alta)
at 11.

According to the Haiks, the Mayor of Alta spoke of doing "everything possible to

regularize the water supply in the basin," and that Alta would "try to work something out with the
Water Department, as they actually I?-ave full control over the water in the canyon." Id (quoting
Pltfs' Exh. 11, at 2-3). "By such_ statements," the Hailes argue, "Alta convinced the property
owners in the Albion Basin to favor annexation." Id at 12. 11

9

In fact, Paragraph 6 of the Policy Declaration recited that 11 [t]bc subject area has been serviced by the
Town of Alta for several years by fire and police protection, avalanche warnin~ 911 emergency communications, library.

and sewage disposal through the Town dump station."
IO

If anything, the Act appears to restrict development in newly annexed areas. See Utah Code Ann. § I 02-418 (1996); Sweetwater Properties v. Town ofAlta, 622 P.2d 1178, 1181-82 (Utah 1981). However, the parties to this
proceeding have not briefed or argued the question whether§ 10-2-418 affected the Haile property in any way.
ll

The Hailes also point to statements made when Mayor Levitt met privately with Albion Basin property

(continued...)
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The Haµcs would now enforce these statements against Alta, apparently as a matter of
promissory estoppel. 12 However,

Utah recognizes the general rule precluding a party from asserting estoppel against
the government Utah State University v. Sutro & Co., 646 P.2d 715, 718 (Utah
1982). This rule safeguards the interests of the public which may be jeopardized
by the 11 vagaries of political tides, frequent changes of public officials, the
possibility of collusion, or of circumventing procedures set up by law, then suing
for the value of goods furnished or services rendered." Id Nonetheless, we
recognize an exception to this general rule in unusual circumstances "when it is
plainly apparent that its application would result in injustice, and there would be no
substantial adverse effect on public policy.... " Id The critical inquiry is "whether
it appears that the facts may be found with such certainty, and the injustice to be
suffered is of sufficient gravity, to invoke the exception." Id at 720.
Prows v. State of Utah, 822 P.2d 764, 769 (Utah 1991).
Alta's 1981 Policy Declaration may itself have some binding force, but informal statements

by the Mayor in the context of the annexation discussions do not operate as an amendment to that

11(...continue
• d)
owners, promising to "do everything p0ssib)e" to allow them to build. Id
12

Though the Hailes' do not invoke promissory estoppel by name, the arguments presented in their
memoranda appear to track its essential elements. As Andreason v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 848 P.2d 171 (Utah Ct.
App. 1993 ), explains:
Promissory estoppel may be invoked in circumstances where " 'equity recognizes the unfairness of
permitting withdrawal of the promise and will enforce it'" Tolboe, 682 P.2d at 846 (quoting'·Union
Tank Car Co. v. Wheat Bros., 15 Utah2d 101,387 P.2d 1000, 1003 (1964)). The necessary elements
of promissory cstoppcl include: "(l) a promise reasonably expected to induce reliance; (2) reasonable
reliance inducing action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person; and {3) delrimenl
to the promisce or third person." Weese v. Davis County Comm'n., 834 P.2d 1, 4 n. 17 (Utah 1992)
(emphasis added). Utah has also adopted the Restatement (Second) of Contracts section 90 describing
promisso.cy estoppel as follows: " 'A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce
action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or
forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement ofthe promise. The remedy
granted for breach may be limited as justice requires.' 11 Tolboe, 682 P.2d at 845 (quoting R-estatement
(Second) Contracts§ 90(1) (1981)).

Id at 174-75 (quoting To/hoe Constr. Co. v. Staker Paving & Constr. Co., 682 P.2d 843 (Utah 1984)), "Promissory
estoppel is historically rooted as a substitute for considcratio~ Allegheny College "V. National Chautauqua County Bank,
246N."(.369, 159NE. 173,57 AL.R.980,perCardozo,C.J.,citing 1 WillistononContracts,Secs.116, 139 .... n

Ravarino v. Price. 123 Utah 559, 568, 260 P.2d 5701 575 (1953).
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document adding water service to the services listed in Paragraph S. "The policy declaration,
including maps, may be amended from time to time by the governing body after at least 20 days'

notice and public hearing." Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-414 ( 1996) (emphasis added). Nothing in
the statute confers upon the Mayor the power to amend. Nor may the Mayor's "promise" be read
into the Annexation Ordinance as a matter of''statutory construction." Pltfs' Reply/Opp. Mem.
(Alta) at 13-14.
The Hailes have established no express legislative or ~ntractual duty on the part of Alta to
supply water to Albion Basin Subdivision # 1. Alta cannot fairly be burdened with an implied legal
duty to supply water that Alta has no legal right to use. Nor can it fairly be said that Alta has
denied to any person the equal protection of its laws simply because it has failed to supply what it
does not have the legal right to supply. 13

It is Salt Lake City, not Alta, that holds the right and exercises the power.
If a duty to supply water exists, that duty must devolve upon the entity with legal righ~ to, _
and lawful control of the water that may be physically available to the Hailes' property-Salt Lake
City.

m.

Salt Lake City and "Prior Written Consent" to the Extension of Water Service

The Haiks assert no duty on the part of Salt Lake City to supply water to the Albion Basin
property; Albion Basin lies beyond the Salt Lake City limits. While the statute provides that a city
operating a waterworks "may sell and deliver the smplus product or service capacity of any such

13

The general duty imposed upon municipalities by Article XI,§ 6 of the Utah Constitution, viz., that "all
such watetworks, water rights, and sources of water supply now owned or hereafter to be acquired by any municipal
corporation, shall be preserved, maintained and operated by it for supplying its inhabitants with water at reasonable
charges," presupposes that the water to be supplied to inhabitants bas already been lawfully acquired by the municipality.

- 17 -
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works, not required by the city

or its inhabitants, to others beyond the limits of the city," Utah

Code Ann. § 10-8-14(1 ), a city plainly is not required to do so. 14 In fact, the Hailes concede that
as a matter of contrac~ Salt Lake City may refuse consent to an extension of water service by
Alta pursuant to the Water Supply Agreement, at least so long as such refusal is "reasonable 11 and

not "arbitrary" or "capricious."
The Haiks contend that they are entitled to test the reasonableness of Salt Lake City1s

refusal tQ consent as "taxpaying property owners of Alta, 11 but should also be treated as "intended
third-party beneficiaries of the Water Supply Agreement." Reply Memorandum in Support of
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, and Response in Opposition to Salt Lake City's CrossMotion for Summary Judgment, filed March 19, 1997 (d.k:t. no. 31) (''Pltfs' Reply Mem. (SLC)"),.
at 11. They aclmowledge "the right of Salt Lake City to exert some control over uses in the
watershed," but deny its right to disallow 11any new residential ·water use, no matter how
environmentally sound" outside of Alta's 1976 lim.its. Id at 19.

A. Implied Covenant of Good F~ith and Fair Dealing
The Haiks assert that Salt Lake City's duty reasonably to give or refuse consent flows
from the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, citing Olympus Hills Shopping Ctr. Ltd

v. Smith's Food and Drug Centers, Inc., 889 P.2d445, 451 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), cert denied,
899 P.2d 1231 (Utah 1995). Olympus Hills recognizes that "parties who retain express power or

14
Indeed, this provision may test the limits of Article XI, Section 6 of the Utah Constitution, which
forbids a municipal corporation to "directly or indirectly, lease, sell, or alien or dispose of any waterworks, water rights, or
sources of water supply now, or hereafter to be owned by it ••••" See generally Hyde P'1Tk Town 1'. Chambers, 99 Utah
118, 104 P.2d 220 (1939) (agreement granting tap rights in consideration for right-of-way held void under Utah Const,
art. XL § 6; dictum that "(i]f they have surplus water they may sell it within legal bounds," citing statute).

- 18-

discretion under contract can exercise that power or discretion in such a way as to breach the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, 11 as where a party "'uses its discretion for a reason outside
of the contemplated range-a reason beyond the risks assumed by the party claiming a breach,"' or
for a reason inconsistent with 11 the justified expectations of the other party." Id at 450, 451
(quoting Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good

Faith, 94 Harv.L.Rev. 369, 385-86 (1980), and Restatement (Second) of Contracts§ 205 cmt. a
(1981)). However, the Haiks do not delineate how Salt Lake City has wrongfully exercised
power or discretion under the Water Supply Agreement, either for a reason beyond the risks that
Alta assumed in that agreement ·or for a reason inconsistent with Alta's ''justified expectations.

11

See id at 451.
Instead, the Hailes assert that Salt Lake Citys distinction between allowing water use

within Alta's city limits under the Water Supply Agreement and refusing consent to its use outside

of Alta's 1976 city limits is simply irrational. While Salt Lake City may rationally limit
development in order to maintain and improve water quality, the Haiks concede, extending water

and sewer service to their property would not def~ this policy, but rather would further Salt
Lake City's watershed protection goals.

That the Hailes' preferred outcome may be reasonable or rational does not of necessity

render the contrary outcome unreasonable or irrational. Circumstances often admit more than
one rational or reasonable result.

Th.at Salt Lake City would refuse consent to extensions in order to limit developmental
i,sprawP' in the Albion Basin, as Salt Lake City avers it has done, does not indicate that it has

• 19 •

wrongfully exercised power or discretion under the Water Supply Agreement, either for a reason

beyond the risks that Alta assumed in that agreement or for a reason inconsistent with Alta's
'Justified expectations. 11 Restriction of Alta's expansion of water service seems to be the clear

import of Paragraph 8.
Paragraph 8 is phrased not in the affirmative language of grant (" Alta may extend its
pipelines ... as approved by Salt Lake City"), but in the negative language of limitation:
"pipelines shall not be extended to or supply water to any properties or facilities not within the
present city limits of Alta without the prior written consent of [Salt Lake] City." In essence,
Paragraph 8 talces the extension of Alta's water pipelines beyond its 1976 limits out of the subject
matter of the Water Supply Agreement and makes such extensions the subject of a futw-e,
separate agreement reqtriring Salt Lake City's prior assent in writing.
The Hailes' counsel have diligently sifted the contract law books in search of a rule that
would compel Salt Lake City to give consent under Paragraph 8 of the Wai.er Supply Agreement,
but they have done so to no avail. The court concludes that the Haiks have failed to establish that
Salt Lake City bas breached any duty reasonably to give or refuse consent, whether under the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, or otherwise.

B. Equal Protection Claims Against Salt Lake City

...

~e Hailes do not challenge the validity of Salt Lake City's 1988 Water Management Plan,
its 1991 Watershed Ordinance, or even the 1976 Water Supply Agreement. Instead they assail

"the irrational distinction Salt Lake City has drawn between uses inside Alta's 1976 Town limits ..
. and uses outside" in refusing to consent to extension of water service under Paragraph 8 the
Water Supply Agreement. Pltfs' Reply/Opp. Mem. (SLC) at 19. The Hailes contend that Salt
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Lake City's refusal to consent to water service violates the Haiks' right to equal protection under
the law because it irrationally treats them differently from other similarly situated property
owners. Allowipg increased water use within the 1976 limits, the Hailes submit, threatens
watershed degradation no less than increased water use outside those limits; where Salt Lake City
allows one, in fairness it should allow the other, particularly where the amount of water already
allocated for use by Alta under the 1976 Agreement would allow for such an extension.
'l)te Hailes have recast their contractual "reasonableness" theory in constitutional terms.
Their argument would also appear to recast Salt Lake City in the role of a local government
furnishing water service to II similarly situated property owners," and whose conduct is to be

scrutinized using the rational basis standard. See Thompson v. Salt Lake City, 724 P.2d at 95960; Bank ofAmerica Nat'/ Trust v. Summer/and County, 767 F.2d 544, 548 (9th Cir. 1985).
Determining whether l~gislation survives rational-basis scrutiny is a two-step process. The

first step is to identity a legitimate government purpose the enacting governmental body could
have been pursuing. The actual motivations of the legislators are unimportant, and the decision
makers are not required to articulate a reason for their acts. The second step of the rational-basis
inquiry is to determine whether a rational basis exists to believe that the legislation would further
the hypothesized purpose. Here the inquiry is whether a conceivably rational basis exists, not
whether that basis was actually considered by the legislative body.
As noted above, however, Salt Lake City has no legal duty to furnish water to users
outside its own city limits, be they "similarly situated" or not As an owner of water rights, Salt
Lake City's role in this instance is proprietary rather than administrative. The equal protection
yardstick is simply not available to measure Salt Lake City's exercise of its contractual power to
-21 -
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consent pursuant to P~graph 8 of the Water Supply Agreement 15.
IV. "Taking" of the Haiks' Albion Basin Property
Alta also moved for summary judgment on the Hailes' claim that their Albion Basin

property has been the subject of a "taking" without payment of just compensation. 16 The Hailes
assert that development of their Albion Basin "was not foreclosed to the Hailes until after they had

purchased the land in 1994,11 when Alta "refused to extend water or sewer to their lots in spite of
the Haiks' willingness to pay for that extension," and consequently denied them a building permit.
Pltfs' Reply/Opp. Mem. (Alta) at 24. "These actions," the Haiks argue, "constitute a taldng.'' Id.
Governmental land use regulation may, under extreme circumstances, amount to a
"taking of the affected private property which entitles the property owner to just compensation
11

under the United States and Utah Constitutions. See, e.g., United States v. Riverside Bayview
Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 126 (1985). To prevail on their taldng claim, the Hailes must show
that Alta's actions (1) did not substantially advance a legitimate public purpose; or (2) denied it

economically viable use of its property. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
1003, 1016 (1992); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987). The fact
that a regulation deprives the property owner. of the most profitable use of his property does not
necessarily. accomplish a taldng or establish the owner's right to just compensatio~ See Andrus v.

lS

Moreover, even if subject to rational basis scrutiny, Salt Lake City responds that limiting development
outside Alta's 1976 limits was accomplished '!for the very pwpose of preventing development over a dispersed area, since
dispersed development has a greater 4etrimental impact on water quality," th,us furnishing a rational oasis for the
distinction challenged by the Hailes. Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendant Salt Lake City's Cross Motion for
Summary Judgment, filed April 9, 1997, at 19. While 'tt!c Hailes dispute this rationale, they have not shown it to be
arbitrary or·capricious, or for that matter, unreasonable.
16

The Hailes appear to make a Rule 56 cross motion on this claim for the first time in their reply
memorandum. See Pltfs' Reply/Opp. Mem. (Alta) at 23 n.13.
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Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979).
In First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County ofLos Angeles, 482 U.S. 304
(1987), cited by the Haiks, the county adopted an ordinance expressly forbidding construction or

reconstruction of buildings on canyon property that had been ravaged first by fire, then by flood,
and then designated as an "interim flood protection area." Id at 307. The Court held that 11 where
the government's activities have already worked a taking of all use ofproperty, no subsequent
action by the government can relieve it of the duty to provide compensation for the period during

which the ~ng was effective.11 Id. at 321 (emphasis added). Here, Alta has adopted no express
prohibition against building in the Albion Basin. Nor do the Hailes suggest that Alta's
conditioning of issuance of building permits upon the availability of 400 gallons of water per day
per unit amounts to a "taking" of all use of their property because it does not advance a legitimate
public policy or unfairly forestalls any reasonable development _Compare Del Monte Dunes at

Monterey v. City ofMonterey, 95 F.3d 1422, 1434 (9th Cir. 1996).
In Nol/an v. California Coastal Commission., the governmental entity conditioned the
issuance of a building permit upon the landowners' surrender of an easement to the public across
their beachfront property. The Court concluded in Nollan that if the governmental entity "wants
an easement across the Nollans' property, it must pay for it." 483 U.S. at 842. Here, Alta has
asked to Haiks to transfer, convey, or smrender nothing.
The Hailes still have in October of 1997 what they purchased from Marvin Melville in

October of 1994: lots in Albion Basin Subdivision #1 with appurtenant water rights limited to 50
gallons per day per unit under the 1963 agreement They retain the "full 'bundle' of property
rights" they purchased. Andrus, 444 U.S. at 66. And notwithstanding the Haiks' assertion that at
-23 -
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the ~e of annexation, "Albion Basin property owners had a right to expect that they would be
able to build homes on their land, 11 Pltfs' Reply/Opp. Mem. (Alta) at 24, 17 they still lack the "one

'strand' of the bundle" that their predecessor in interest also did not have: a legal right to use water
in an amount sufficient to satisfy the health department requirement of 400 gallons per day per
unit. The Haiks cannot build on their property, not because Alta or Salt Lake City have changed

the rules, but rather because the rules remain the same.
The right to use real property, as part of the constitutional right to "property" protected by
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, does not carry with it a corollary right to use water already
put to other beneficial use by a prior appropriator. Nor does such a right obtain upon annexation

iii .. "

in the form of an entitlement to "municipal services. 11 Otherwise, state and local governments in
the arid West could conceivably be held to have "taken" all lands for which no unappropriated
water exists to be supplied through state, county or city systems.

In Lockary v. Kayfetz, 917 F.2d 1150 (9th Cir .1990), owners of undeveloped land who
had been refused water hookups by a local public utility district sought compensation for the
tiling of their property because the lack of water hookups made them ineligible for county

building permits and denied them all ~nomically viable use of their land. Reversing summary
judgment in favor of the utility district, the Ninth Circuit observed:
Withholding available water from land zoned exclusively for residential use
might interfere with the landowners' reasonable investment-backed expectations by
preventing all practical use of that land. • • • That the [plaintiffs] can still walk on,
or ride a bike on, or lo<;>k at their land does not, at this preliminmy stage of the
case, reassure us to the contrary. In this context, assuming that the [plaintiffs]

17
The Supreme Court has suggested that where an owner is denied only some economica11y viable uses, a
taJcing still may have occurred where government action has a sufficient economic impact and interferes with distinct
investment-backed expectations. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019-20 n.8.
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can show that sufficient water was available, then BCPUD's water moratorium
may indeed constitute more than a mere reduction in property value. Cf. Trustees
for Alaska v. E.P.A., 749 F.2d 549, 560 (9th Cir. 1984) (mere reduction in
property value does not establish a denial of all economically viable use of
property).
917 F.2d at 1155 (emphasis added & citation omitted). To establish a taking of their property,
the landowners in Lockary.were thus required to establish first that sufficient water was available

to be furnished through the utility district hookups they requested.
Here, it appears from the record that neither the Hailes nor the Town of Alta have
available the water necessary to make an 11economically viable use" of the Albion Basin property
through construction of residential dwellings. While Alta has rights under the Water Supply
Agreement to more water than it currently uses, that water is not legally 11 available11 outside Alta1s
1976 limits without the consent of the proprietor, Salt Lake City. As the Ninth Circuit
acknowledged i.µ Lockary, if the loss of economic viability of property 11is caused by something
other than the government regulation, it does not constitute a taldng." 917 F.2d at 1155 (citing

Bedfordv. United States, 192 U.S. 217,225 (1904)).
On the present record, it appears that the Hailes' taking claim also f~ as a matter of law.
V. Defendants' Motion to Strike Certain Exhibits

Alta also filed a motion to strike certain of the Hailes' exhibitsts as, i,:zter alia, not properly
autµenticated for purposes of Rule 56. Salt Lake City joined Alta's motion by footnote. See
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and in Support of
Defendant Salt Lake City's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, filed January 22, 1997 (dkt. no.

IK

Specifically, Alta objects to Exhibits 6, 16, 17. 24, 26, 27, 31, 40 and42 to the Memorandum in
Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.

~rt')
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19), at 7 n.2. 19 The Hailes respond that the challenged documents were obtained pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 63-2-102 from the defendants' own files and that there exist sufficent indicia of
authenticity to render.the exhibits admissible even at trial. Pltfs' Reply/Opp. Mem. (Alta) at 1-8.
.
.~
Generally, under Rule 56 the moving party must adduce admissible evidence to

·

demons~te that there are no genuine issues of material fact which preclude entry of summary
judgment, for it is.clear that "only admissible evidence may be considered by the trial court in
ruling on a motion for summary judgment II Beyene v. Coleman Security Systems Services, Inc.,

854 F.2d 1179, 1181 (9th Cir. 1988). Accord, Hall v. Bel/mon, 935 F.2d 1106 (10th Cir. 1991);

Jones v. Wilkinson, 800 F.2d 989, 1002 (IOtlt Cir. 1986) ("Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 ... requires that
material supporting a motion for summary judgment be admissible evidence"); World ofSleep.

Inc. v. Lay-Z-Boy Chair Co., 756 F.2d 1467, 1474 (10th Cir. lQ&S)("Under Fed.R..Civ.P. 56(e),
the court may consider only admissible evidence in ruling on a motion for summary judgment. 11 );
HB. Zachry Co. v. O'Brien, 378 F.2d 423,425 (10th Cir. 1967).
A moving party may ... supplement the motion with affidavits, pleadings,
deposition transcripts, interrogatory answers, admissions, stipulations, transcripts
from another proceeding, oral testimony, authenticated exhibits, and anything of
which the court may properly take judicial notice. To be considered, the facts
contained in these materials must be admissible or usable a! trial, although for
pwpos~ of summary judgment, the facts need not be presented to the court in a
form admissible at trial.

Steven Baicker-McKee, et al., Federal Civil Rules Handbook 600 (1997 ed.) (emphasis added &
footnote omitted).

Rule 56(e) expres~ly requires that summary judgment affidavits "set forth:such facts as

19

While Salt Lake City points to plaintiffs' Exhibits 14, 17, 23, 27, and 40 as having disputed
authenticity, Alta's motion to strike did not address Exhibits 14 and 23 and are not encompassed within Salt Lake City's
joinder in that motion.
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would be admissible in evidence ••.. 11 The same principles apply to deposition testimony and
other foDll.S of evidence approved for use on summary judgment by Rule 56(c). See Garside v.

Osco Drug, Inc., 895 F.2d 46, 49 (1st Cir. 1990); Klein v. Trustees ofIndiana University, 766
F.2d 275, 283 (7th Cir. 1985) (''the party opposing the summary judgment motion must present
affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories, or admissions which set forth disputed facts in

a form admissible in evidence.") 762 F.2d 952); Clay v. Equifax, Inc., 762 F.2d 952, 956 (11th
Cir. 1985). As the court observed in Martz v. Unio7: Labor Life Ins. Co., 757 F.2d 135, 138 (7th
Cir. 1985): "The facts must be established through one of the vehicles designed to ensure
reliability and veracity-depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions and affidavits. When a
party seeks to offer evidence througp. other exhibits, they must be identified by affidavit or
otherwise made admissible in evidence. 6 Moore's Federal Practice P 56.11(1.-8] (2d ed. 1983). 11
See also Singer v. Wadman, 595 F. Supp. 188,269 (D. Utah) (Wmder, J.). Only deposition

testimony that in substance would be admissible in evidence at trial may be introduced on a
summary judgment motion. Skillskyv. Lucky Stores, Inc., 893 F.2d 1088, 1091 (9th Cir. 1990)
(deposition testimony that is not based on ~anal knowledge and is hearsay is inadmissible and
cannot raise a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to withstand summary judgment); Jacobsen

v. Filler, 190 F.2d 1362, 1367 (9th Cir.1986).
The Hailes may be correct that when examined, each of the challenged exhibits would
prove to be authentic.20 Nevertheless, as moving parties under Rule 56, the Hailes are bound to
20

However, as a general rule, newspaper articles (e.g., Exhibit 40) arc not admissible for purposes of
summa,y judgment See, e.g., Horta v. Sullivan, 4 F.3d 2, 8 (1st Cir. 1993) {court refused to consider hearsay newspaper
account in cxlu"bit form and asserted that "inadmissi'ble evidence may not be considered"}; Dowdell v. Chapm~ 930
F.Supp. 533,541 (:M.D. Ala. 1996) Tiltonv. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 905 F.Supp. 1514, 1544 (ND. Okla. 1995) (a
"newspaper article is not proper evidence for submission on summary judgment as it is inadmissible hearsay").

(continued...)
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abide by the rule's requirements concerning the admissibility of Rule 56(c) materials. For that

reason, the defendants' motion to strike plaintiffs' Exhibits 6, 16, 17, 24, 26, 27, 31, 40 and 42
should be granted. 21

Conclusion
The Hailes have failed to show that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law that
the Town of Alta, by declining to extend its water service to the Haiks' Albion Basin property, has
denied th~m equal protection of the laws, or breached any other asserted statutory or contractual

duty·to furnish culinary water. The Hailes likewise have failed to establish a breach of any
contractual or other legal duty on the part of Salt Lake City to approve the extension of Alta's
water lines to serve the Hailes' property. The parties having established the absence of any
genuine issue of material fact, it now appears that the Town of Alta and Salt Lake City are each
entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the Hailes' pleaded claims. Therefore,
IT IS ORDERED that plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment is DENIED; that
defendant Town of alta1s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED; that the Town of Alta's
motion to strike is GRANTED; and that Salt Lake City's motion for summary judgment is

20

21

( ...

continued)

•

1

The Haiks requested a continuance should "the Court determine that the challenged exhibits must be
struck, and that without them it must deny the plaintiffs1 Motion for Summary Judgment." Pltfs' Reply/Opp. Mem. (Alta)
at 8. It appears, however, that the exhibits in question•are not material to the issues that the Court has determined to be
dispositive, and a continuance to permit authentication of the exhibits appears unnecessary.
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GRANTED, and plaintilfs' complaint shall be and hereby is DlS?vflSSED.
DATED this .1L day of October, 1997.

BY THE COURT:

i
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TOWN of Alta, a political subdivision
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Corporation, a political subdivision of
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ORDER AND JUDGMENT

*

*1 Raymond A. Haile and Mark C. Haik (the Hailes)
appeal the district court's grant of summary judgment in
favor of defendants, the Town of Alta (Alta) and Salt
Lake City Corporation (Salt Lake City) on their equal
protection and taking claims.

Background

In October, 1994, the Hailes purchased lots 25, 26, 29,
and 30, of the Albion Basin Subdivision # 1 (Albion
Basin) located above the Alta and Snowbird ski resorts
at the top of Little Cottonwood Canyon, east of Salt
Lake City, Utah. Toe Haiks then contacted Alta regarding
water and sewer services for their lots. Alta responded
in November, 1994, that it does not provide water and
sewer services to Albion Basin and referred the Haiks to
Salt Lake City's Department of Public Utilities, Water
Division. In April, 1995, the Hailes requested applications

for building permits and sewer and water services from
Alta. Alta responded that it would be premature to begin
the building permit process until the Hailes had procured
adequate water and approval for a full containment
sewage holding tank. The Hailes then sought information
from Salt Lake City regarding water service to Albion
Basin. In 1996, Salt Lake City notified the Hailes that it
declined to consent to the extension of Alta water pipes
and water supply to Albion Basin, relying on paragraph
8 of the 1976 Water Supply Agreement and the 1991
Watershed Ordinance, § 17.04.020 of Salt Lake City's
Ordinances.
Alta receives its water supply from Salt Lake City by virtue
of the August 12, 1976, INTERGOVERNMENTAL
AGREEMENT-WATER SUPPLY AGREEMENT
SALT LAKE CITY TO ALTA CITY (the 1976 Water
Supply Agreement). (Appellants' App. Vol. I, Tab 9.) The
1976 Water Supply Agreement "make[s] available to Alta
for its use, ... , the normal flow of raw, untreated water,
not to exceed 265,000 gallons per day, .... " Id at 97 ,r I.
Paragraph 8, relied on by Salt Lake City, contains the
following restriction:
8. It is expressly understood and
agreed that said pipelines shall not
be extended to or supply water
to any properties or facilities not
within the present city limits of Alta
without the prior written consent of
[Salt Lake] City.

Id at 99 ,r 8. It is undisputed that Albion Basin lays beyond
the 1976 Alta city limits. It is also undisputed that the
Board of Health required lots to be supplied with 400
gallons of water per day as a precondition for issuance of
a building permit and that the lots were each entitled to
only 50 gallons of water per day from a water agreement
with Little Cottonwood Water Company.
In October, 1997, the Haiks initiated this action, claiming
that because Alta has surplus water and the lots are
located within the current town limits, Alta had a legal
duty to supply water to their lots based on Alta's historical
conduct and applicable state and federal laws. 1 Id Vol.
I at 6 ,r 20. The Hailes contended that: (1) Alta had taken
and damaged their property for public use by refusing
to extend its municipal services to Albion Basin and by
its refusal to grant them a building permit, in violation
of Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution, id at
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11 1 39; (2) Alta's actions in furtherance of its policy
of non-development have been arbitrary and capricious,
depriving them of their right to substantive due process
and equal protection of the law under the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and 42
U.S.C. § 1983, id at 13 ,r 47; (3) Alta's actions deprived
them of their rights to substantive due process and equal
protection of the law under Article I, Sections 7 and 24
of the Utah Constitution and violated the Annexation
Ordinance and Utah Code section 10-2-401(4), which
required Alta to make the same level of municipal services
available to their property as it does to others, id at 14
,r 50; (4) they were entitled to a declaration that the 1976
Water Supply Agreement does not preclude the extension
of Alta's water lines to their lots; id at 15 ,r 54; and ( 5)
they were entitled to an injunction preventing Salt Lake
City from raising the 1976 Water Supply Agreement as a
defense to the extension of Alta's water lines and requiring
Alta to make municipal services available to their lots in
order to receive a building permit, id at 16 ,r 59.
*2 On October 31, 1997, the district court granted
summary judgment in favor of Alta and Salt Lake City.
Id Vol. Ill at 853-81. On the Hailes' equal protection claim
against Alta, the district court concluded that the claim
"presupposed the existence of a legal a duty on the part
of Alta to supply water to property owners such as the
Hailes, as well as the legal and physical capacity to do so."
Id at 860. The court then noted that while Alta may have
the physical capacity to supply water to the Hailes' lots,
Alta does not have the legal capacity to do so under the
terms of the 1976 Water Supply Agreement, without Salt
Lake City's consent. Id at 865-66. On the Hailes' equal
protection claim against Salt Lake City, the court found
that: (a) the Hailes "failed to establish that Salt Lake City
had breached any duty [to ] reasonably ... give or refuse
consent, whether under the implied covenant of good faith
dealing, or otherwise," id at 872, and (b) equal protection
is not available to challenge Salt Lake City's exercise of its
contractual power to consent pursuant to paragraph 8 of
the 1976 Water Supply Agreement because it had no legal
duty to furnish water to users outside its own city limits,
be they '~similarly situated" or not, id at 873-74. On the
Haiks' annexation claim, the district court concluded that
they failed to establish an express legislative or contractual
duty on the part of Alta to supply water to their property
and Alta cannot be fairly burdened with an implied legal
duty to supply water that Alta has no legal right to use.
Id at 869. The court then rejected the Haiks' taking claim
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against Alta on the ground that "neither the Hailes nor the
Town of Alta ha[d] available the water necessary to make
an 'economically viable use' of the Albion Basin property
through construction of residential dwelling," id at 877,
and the Hailes retain the " 'full 'bundle' of property rights'
they purchased," id at 875. The court reasoned that if the
loss of economic viability is caused by something other
than the government regulation, it does not constitute a
taking. Id at 877.
On appeal, the Haiks contend that the district court erred:
(1) in concluding that they could not bring an equal
protection claim against Salt Lake City because it was
acting in a proprietary capacity in supplying water outside
its corporate limits; (2) in concluding that Alta did not
violate their right to equal protection by refusing to extend
its water lines to their lots, in view of the district court's
finding that Alta was physically able to supply water and
they were willing and able to pay the costs of connection;
(3) in failing to recognize that Salt Lake City's refusal to
consent to Alta's extension of water to their lots could not
be reasonable where it was not based on any finding that
their proposed use would be detrimental to the watershed,
but on a collusive desire to prevent any development in
the upper Albion Basin; and (4) in determining no taking
occurred even though they are completely unable to build
on their lots.
*3 We review the district court's order granting summary
judgment de novo, applying the same standard as the
district court. Thomas v. International Bus. Machs., 48
F.3d 478, 484 (10th Cir.1995). Summary judgment is
appropriate only "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).
"We examine the factual record and reasonable inferences
therefrom in the light most favorable to [the nonmovants], who opposed summary judgment." Thom.as, 48
F.3dat484.

Discussion

I. Equal Protection
The Hailes argue that they have asserted a viable equal
protection claim against Salt Lake City. The Hailes
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maintain that: (1) Salt Lake City's refusal to consent to
the extension of Alta's water lines to their property is a
governmental act subject to equal protection challenges,
and (2) even if Salt Lake City acted in a proprietary rather
than a governmental capacity, equal protection challenges
may be raised against governmental entities acting in their
propriety capacities. The Haiks declare that Salt Lake
City's refusal to consent to Alta's extension of its water
lines to their lots could not be reasonable in that it was
not based on any finding that their proposed use would
be detrimental to the watershed, but on a collusive desire
to prevent any development in the upper Albion Basin. 2
In addition, the Haiks reason that the district court erred
in concluding that Alta did not violate their right to equal
protection by refusing to extend its water lines to their
lots, in view of the district court's finding that Alta was
physically able to supply water and they were willing and
able to pay the costs of connection. 3

A. Federal Equal Protection
According to the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, ''No State shall ... deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. This Clause
"embodies a general rule that States must treat like cases
alike but may treat unlike cases accordingly." Vacco
v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, ---, 117 S.Ct. 2293, 2297, 138
L.Ed.2d 834 (1997). Unless a legislative classification
or distinction burdens a fundamental right or targets
a suspect class, courts will uphold it if it is rationally
related to a legitimate end. Id
Tonkovich v. Kansas Bd of Regents, 159 F.3d 504, 532
(10th Cir.1998).
"The interest in water for real estate development is not
a fundamental right." Lockary v. Kayfetz, 917 F.2d 1150,
1155 (9th Cir.1990). See also O'Neal v. City of Seattle,
66 F.3d 1064, 1067 (9th Cir.1995) (equal protection claim
based on denial of water service reviewed under rational
basis standard because it affects only economic interests,
not fundamental rights); Magnuson v. City of Hickory
Hills, 933 F.2d 562, 567 (7th Cir.1991) ("We do not
consider the right to continued municipal water service
such a fundamental right; .... "); Ransom v. Marrazzo,
848 F.2d 398, 413 (3d Cir.1988) (strict scrutiny not
required because water service is not a fundamental right);
Chatham v. Jackson, 613 F.2d 73, 80 (5th Cir.1980)
(water service not a fundamental right). Thus, to meet a

constitutional challenge the state action in question needs
only some rational relation to a legitimate state interest.
City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297,303, 96 S.Ct.
2513, 49 L.Ed.2d 511 (1976); Tonkovich, 159 F.3d at 532.
Moreover, because state action subject to rational basis
review is presumptively constitutional, the burden is on
the plaintiffs to establish that the state action is irrational
or arbitrary and that it cannot conceivably further a
legitimate governmental interest. Riddle v. Mondragon, 83
F.3d 1197, 1207 (10th Cir.1996). "Under the rational basis
test, if there is a 'plausible reason[] for [the state] action,
our inquiry is at an end.'" United States v. Castillo, 140
F.3d 874,883 (10th Cir.1998) (quoting United States R.R Retirement Bd v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166,179,101 S.Ct. 453, 66
L.Ed.2d 368 (1980)). "We need not fmd that the legislature
ever articulated this reason, nor that it actually underlay
the legislative decision, nor even that it was wise." Id
(citations omitted).
*4 There are plausible reasons for Alta's refusal to
extend its water lines to the Haiks' property. Alta has a
legitimate state interest in not breaching its 1976 Water
Supply Agreement. Alta does not have an independent
right to water; it merely purchases water from Salt Lake
City. Thus, while Alta may have the physical capacity to
supply water to the Haiks' lots, it does not have the legal
right to do so, and to compel Alta to breach its contract
would be unreasonable. Nor, we add, does Alta have a
legal obligation under Utah law to provide the Haiks
with water. A series of Utah Supreme Court cases have
specifically expressed that "a municipal corporation ...
does not have a legal duty to provide water service to
all members of the public.... " Thompson v. Salt Lake
City Corp., 724 P.2d 958, 959 (Utah 1986). See Rose
v. Plymouth, 110 Utah 358, 173 P.2d 285, 286 (Utah
1946). The Utah Supreme Court recently reinforced that
a municipality need only act "reasonably'' with respect to
the provision of municipal services to its residents. See
Platt v. Town of Torrey, 949 P.2d 325, 329 (1997). We find
Alta treated the Haiks reasonably here.
Furthermore, Salt Lake City has a legitimate interest in
preserving its watershed. The Haiks failed to establish
that Salt Lake City's refusal to consent to the extension
of Alta's water lines to their property was irrational
or arbitrary or that it could not conceivably further
a legitimate governmental interest in view of the
extensive evidence presented by Salt Lake City regarding
preservation of its watershed, Little Cottonwood Canyon.
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The Hailes challenge Salt Lake City's stated interest in
protecting the watershed by noting Salt Lake City has
consented to other extensions and uses not contemplated
by the 1976 Water Supply Agreement. The additional
uses referred to are Alta's 1995 extension, without Salt
Lake City's consent, of its lines to the Alpenglow Lodge,
Salt Lake City's consent in 1988 and again in 1993
to allow Alta Ski Lifts Company to use additional
water for snowmaking, and Salt Lake City's consent in
1992 to provide water to the U.S. Forest Service for
recreational purposes at the Albion Basin campground.
Because Alpenglow sits within Alta's 1976 boundaries,
extension of the lines without Salt Lake City's consent
was appropriate and is irrelevant to plaintiffs' claim of
unequal and irrational treatment. This same explanation
applies to Salt Lake City's 1988 consent for snowmak.ing
purposes, which was similarly limited. Finally, the City's
1992 consent to allow the Forest Service to use water
for recreational purposes and 1993 consent to allow
additional snowmak.ing were authorized by 1991 Salt
Lake City ordinance § 17 .04.020.B, which authorized
the City to consent only to use for snowmaking or fire
protection, use by certain governmental entities on land
owned or leased by those entities, and use by residential
property owners with a spring on their property. See
Appellant's App. at 327-28. Significantly,§ 17 .04 prohibits
the City from consenting to any use-including extension of
Alta's water lines to the Haiks' property-other than these
three articulated uses, or amending any current permit to
enlarge the service boundary or increase the water supply.
See id at 327. The Salt Lake City Council has made
a rational legislative determination that the particular
uses above, even if outside existing service areas, will
not result in significant harm to the watershed, whereas
increased residential and commercial use outside existing
service areas (in this case Alta's 1976 town boundaries) will
result in such damage. This classification is rational and
is related to the City's stated objective of protecting the
watershed.
*5 In short, Alta and Salt Lake City proffer they had
to draw the line somewhere, and chose to do so in the
1976 Agreement at Alta's 1976 town boundaries. They do
not claim to be seeking to stop all development in the
canyon, or even all development in Alta for that matter.
Rather, their purported objective is to curtail further
environmentally harmful development outside Alta's 1976
town boundaries. Line-drawing "inevitably requires that
some persons who have an almost equally strong claim to

favored treatment be placed on different sides of the lines.
[That] the line might have been drawn differently at some
points is" not a matter for judicial consideration. Federal
Communications Comm'n v. Beach Communications, Inc.,
508 U.S. 307, 315-16, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 124 L.Ed.2d 211
(quoting United States RR. Retirement Bd v. Fritz, 449
U.S. 166, 179, 101 S.Cl 453, 66 L.Ed.2d 368 (1980)).

B. Utah Equal Protection

Article I, § 24 of the Utah Constitution states: "All
laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation."
Utah Const. Art. I, § 24. Although this language is
dissimilar to its federal counterpart, "these provisions
embody the same general principle: persons similarly
situated should be treated similarly, and persons in
different circumstances should not be treated as if their
circumstances were the same." Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d
661, 669 (Utah 1984). "First, a law must apply equally
to all persons within a class." Id at 670. "Second,
the statutory classifications and the different treatment
given the classes must be based on differences that have
a reasonable tendency to further the objectives of the
statute." Id If the relationship of the classification to
the objectives is unreasonable or fanciful, the disparate
treatment is unreasonable. Id We presume that the state
acted on a reasonable basis. Id at 671 n. 14. However, that
presumption does not require us to accept any conceivable
reason for the state action. Id. "Rather, we judge such
enactments on the basis of reasonable or actual ...
purpose." Id Additionally, a municipal corporation "does
not have a legal duty to provide water service to all
members of the public, .... " Thompson v. Salt Lake City
Corp., 724 P.2d 958, 959 (Utah 1986).
Alta consistently refused to extend ~ts water lines outside
its 1976 city limits without Salt Lake City's permission.
Thus, Alta treats all persons in the class of property
owners outside its 1976 city limits, including the Hailes,
the same. Furthermore, Alta's and Salt Lake City's actions
were reasonable.
Therefore, we hold that Alta and Salt Lake City did not
violate the Hailes' equal protection rights under either
federal or state law.
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II. Taking
*6 The Haik:s contend that the district court erred in
determining no taking occurred even though they are
completely unable to build on their lots. The Hailes assert
that it is immaterial that Alta has not expressly prohibited
building in the Albion Basin because by denying them
a building permit for their lots without culinary water,
Alta has deprived them of all viable economic use of
their property. Additionally, the Haiks point out that a
regulatory taking can exist even when no exaction has
been demanded by the state and that it is immaterial that
the applicable regulations and ordinances predated their
ownership as a property owner can "come" to a taking. 4
The Haiks brought their taking claim exclusively under
Article I, § 22 of the Utah Constitution, which provides,
"Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public
use without just compensation." 5 Utah Const. Art. I, §22.
"This provision is broader in its language than the similar
provision in the Fifth Amendment of the United States
Constitution." Bagford v. Ephraim City, 904 P.2d 1095,
1097 (Utah 1995). To recover, "a claimant must possess a
protectable interest in property that is taken or damaged
for a public use." Id See Farmers New World Life Ins.
Co. v. Bountiful City, 803 P.2d 1241, 1243-44 (Utah 1990);
Colman v. Utah State Land Bd, 795 P.2d 622, 625 (Utah
1990). In Colman, the Utah Supreme Court observed:

Many statutes and ordinances regulate what a property
owner can do with and pn the owner's property. Those
regulations may have a significant impact on the utility
or value of property, yet they generally do not require
compensation under article I, section 22. Only when
governmental action rises to the level of a taking or
damage under article I, section 22 is the State required
to pay compensation.
Coleman, 795 P.2d at 627. "[A] 'taking' is 'any
substantial interference with private property which
destroys or materially lessens its value, or by which
the owner's right to its use and enjoyment is in any
substantial degree abridged or destroyed.' " Id at 626
(quoting State ex rel., State Road Comm'n v.· District
Court, Fourth Judicial Dist. in andfor Utah County, 94
Utah 384, 78 P.2d 502, 506 (Utah 1937)).

The district court found that "[t]he Hailes still have in
October 1997 what they purchased from Marvin Melville
in October of 1994: lots in Albion Basin Subdivision# 1
with appurtenant water rights limited to 50 gallons per day
per unit under the 1963 agreement. They retain the "full
'bundle' of property rights" they purchased." (Appellants'
App. Vol. III at 875.) "[T]hey still lack the "one 'strand' of
the bundle" that their predecessor in interest also did not
have: a legal right to use water in an amount sufficient to
satisfy the health department requirement of 400 gallons
per day per unit." Id at 876. The district court determined
that "[t]he Haiks cannot build on their property, not
because Alta or Salt Lake City have changed the rules, but
rather because the rules remain the same." Id
*7 The Hailes cannot maintain a taking claim because
they did not have a protectable interest in property that
was taken or damaged by Alta's denial of a building
permit. Alta's denial of a building pennit was based
on the health department requirement of 400 gallons
of water per day per unit, which the Hailes did not
meet. As the Court in Coleman pointed out, " '[m]any
statutes and ordinances regulate what a property owner
can do with and on the owner's property ... yet they
generally do not require compensation.... " Coleman, 795
P.2d at 627. This is but one of many such regulations.
See Smith Inv. Co. v. Sandy City, 958 P.2d 245, 253 (Utah
Ct.App.1998) ("If the ordinance and the state policies
and reasons underlying it do, within reason, debatably
promote the legitimate goals of increased public health,
safety, or general welfare, we must allow ... legislative
judgment to control."). Furthermore, mere expectation of
municipal water service in the future is not a legal right
that constitutes property subject to taking. See Bagford,
904 P.2d at 1099 (expectation of renewal of lease not
property subject to taking). Therefore, we hold that no
taking occurred under the Utah Constitution Article I,§
22.

AFFIRMED.

All Citations
176 F.3d 488 (Table), 1999 WL 190717, 1999 CJ C.A.R.
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This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may

~

1

be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
The Haiks initiated this action in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. (Appellants'

2

App. Vol. I at 1.) Salt Lake City removed the action to federal district court. Id. at 34.
We assume for the purposes of this discussion only that the Haiks may maintain an equal protection claim against Salt

3

Lake City.
The Haiks initially brought their equal protection claim under both the United States Constitution and the Utah Constitution.
It is unclear whether the district court considered their equal protection claim under both state and federal law or solely

J

under state law. It is also unclear under which their appeal lies. However, in the interests of finality, we will consider their

4

claim under both federal and state law.
The Haiks brought this claim solely against Alta. Therefore, we will not consider the Haiks' statements on appeal that, "No
taking of the full economic use of the Haiks1 property occurred until Salt Lake City denied its consent to extend water to
them in 1996. In refusing to consent, Salt Lake City went beyond what the relevant background principles would dictate
and hence worked a taking." (Brief for Appellants at 37) (internal quotation and citations omitted).

5

Therefore, we will not consider the Haiks' appellate arguments that Alta's actions constitute a taking under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. See Brief for Appellants at 32 ("The denial of a building permit
to the Haiks constitutes a taking for which the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments require just compensation, ...."); id. at 37.

End of Document
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2013 WL 968141

Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court,
D. Utah,
Central Division.

Mark Charles HAIK, an Individual; and
Raymond A. Haile, an Individual, Plaintiffs,

of the elements of a cause of action will not do.' Nor
does a complaint suffice if it tenders 'naked assertion[s}'
devoid of 'further factual enhancement.' " 4 "The court's
function on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is not to weigh
potential evidence that the parties might present at trial,
but to assess whether the plaintiffs complaint alone is
legally sufficient to state a claim for which relief may be
granted." 5 As the Court in Iqbal stated,

v.
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION; a municipal

corporation; Jeffery Thomas Niermeyer, an
Individual; Town of Alta; a municipal corporation;
and John Guldner an Individual, Defendants.
No. 2:12-CV-997TS.

I
March 12, 2013.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS
TED STEWART, District Judge.
*1 This matter is before the Court on three motions
to dismiss: (1) Defendants Salt Lake City and Town
of Alta's Joint Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss; (2)
Defendant Jeffery T. Niermeyer's Rule 12(b)(6) Motion
to Dismiss; and (3) Defendant John Guldner's F.R.C.P.
12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim.
For the reasons discussed below, the Court will grant
Defendants' Motions and dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint.

I. MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD

In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted under Rule 12(b)
(6), all well-pleaded factual allegations, as distinguished
from conclusory allegations, are accepted as true and
viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs as the
nonmoving party. 1 Plaintiffs must provide "enough facts
to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face" 2
which requires "more than an unadorned, the-defendantunlawfully harmed-me accusation." 3 "A pleading that
offers 'labels and conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation

only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief
survives a motion to dismiss. Determining whether a
complaint states a plausible claim for relief will ... be a
context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to
draw on its judicial experience and common sense. But
where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to
infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the
complaint has alleged-but it has not show[n]-that the
pleader is entitled to relief. 6
When considering the adequacy of a plaintiff's allegations
in a complaint subject to a motion to dismiss, a
district court not only considers the complaint, but also
"documents incorporated into the complaint by reference,
and matters of which a court may take judicial notice." 7
Thus, "notwithstanding the usual rule that a court should
consider no evidence beyond the pleadings on a Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, '[a] district court may consider
documents referred to in the complaint if the documents
are central to the plaintiffs claim and the parties do not
dispute the documents' authenticity.'" 8

II. BACKGROUND

The following facts are taken from Plaintiffs' Complaint,
the materials attached thereto, and other documents
referenced by the parties. The facts are viewed in the light
most favorable to Plaintiffs and are accepted as true for
the purposes of Defendants' Motions.
Plaintiffs Mark and Raymond Haile (the "Hailes") own
certain parcels of land in the Albion Basin (hereinafter
"Albion Basin Subdivision"). The Albion Basin is located
above the Alta and Snowbird ski resorts at the top
of Little Cottonwood Canyon in Salt Lake County,
Utah. To properly understand the current dispute, it is
necessary to understand the contractual, regulatory, and
legal background concerning water in the Albion Basin.
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*2 In 1963, Canyonlands, Inc., an apparent predecessor
in interest to Plaintiffs, entered into a contract with the
Little Cottonwood Water Company, which promised the
availability of not more than 50 gallons per day to users
in each of not more than 35 cabins to be constructed
in Albion Basin Subdivision # L Salt Lake City later
succeeded to the Little Cottonwood Water Company's
obligations under various water supply agreements,
including the 1963 agreement.

consent of' Salt Lake City. 14 The Haiks' property lies
outside the Alta city limits as they existed in 1976.

In 1971, Marvin Melville, from whom Plaintiffs would

In 1991, Salt Lake City adopted its Watershed Ordinance.
Among other things, the Watershed Ordinance prohibited
Salt Lake City from entering into any new water sales
agreements or expanding any existing agreements, with
three exceptions: (I) water sales for residential use to
property owners with a spring on the property; (2) water
sales to governmental entities for use on land they own
or lease; or (3) water sales for snowmaking and fire
protection in certain cases.

later purchase their lots, applied for a permit "to
construct a four-plex on lots in an approved subdivision

Plaintiffs "stepped into this milieu" when they purchased

9

known as Albion Basin Subdivision # 1." Salt Lake
County refused to grant the permits, maintaining that
the plaintiffs "had not proved their rights to an adequate
culinary water supply." 10 Mr. Melville sought mandamus
relief from the Utah courts.
In order to obtain a building permit, the county required
400 gallons of water per day, per unit. Mr. Melville argued
that he had sufficient water to meet these requirements,
pointing to a spring and the agreement with the Little
Cottonwood Water Company. The Utah Supreme Court
found that Melville did not own the rights to the spring
water. The court also found that the agreement with
the Little Cottonwood Water Company did not provide
sufficient water. As stated, that agreement only allowed
for "a quantity of water not to exceed 50 gallons per
day." 11 Based on this, the Utah Supreme Court found
that "[a]t most plaintiffs have proved that they may have
a right to 50 gallons of water per unit constructed, which
does not meet the County Board of Health's requirement
of 400 gallons per unit per day." 12 As a result, the Utah
Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of Mr.
Melville's request for mandamus relief.
In 1976, Salt Lake City and the Town of Alta entered into
the Water Supply Agreement. Under the Water Supply
Agreement, Salt Lake City agreed "to make available to
Alta for its use, as hereinafter described, the normal flow
of raw, untreated water, not to exceed 265,000 gallons per
day." 13 However, the Water Supply Agreement stated
that Alta's water "pipelines shall not be extended to or
supply water to any properties or facilities not within
the present city limits of Alta without the prior written

their lots from Mr. Melville m 1994. 15 After purchasing
the property, the Haiks sought water from Alta. Alta
informed Plaintiffs that it did not provide water and sewer
services to their property, and referred them to the Salt
Lake City Department of Public Works. Salt Lake City,
in tum, declined to consent to an extension of Alta water
pipes and water supply to Plaintiffs' property, relying
on the Water Supply Agreement and the Watershed
Ordinance.
*3 Plaintiffs brought suit against Alta and Salt Lake
City, alleging that Alta had a legal duty to extend
municipal water service to their lots and that, without such
extension, they were entitled to just compensation for a
taking of their property. Plaintiffs brought various claims,
including claims that Alta and Salt Lake City violated the
equal protection, due process, and takings clauses of the
United States and Utah constitutions.
That matter was eventually removed to this Court and was
heard by the Honorable Judge Bruce Jenkins. On October
31, 1997, Judge Jenkins granted summary judgment in
favor of Alta and Salt Lake City. In a thorough decision,
Judge Jenkins rejected all of Plaintiffs' claims.
Judge Jenkins first rejected Plaintiffs' equal protection
claims against Alta. Plaintiff had argued "that Alta, by
refusing their requests to extend water service to the
Haiks' Albion Basin properties, has acted in arbitrary
and irrational fashion and has thereby denied the Hailes
equal protection of the law." 16 But this "contention
presupposes the existence of a legal duty on the part
of Alta to supply water to property owners such as the
Hailes, as well as the legal and physical capacity to do
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so." 17 Judge Jenkins held that Alta had no duty to supply
water and that their capacity to do so was constrained
by the Water Supply Agreement. Thus, the Court held
that "[w]ater is not available to the Hailes under the Water
Supply Agreement absent Salt Lake City's consent to an
extension of service beyond Alta's 1976 limits. Where Salt
Lake City withholds consent, Alta has no legal right to
extend water service to the Hailes." 18
Judge Jenkins found:
The Hailes have established no express legislative or
contractual duty on the part of Alta to supply water
to Albion Basin Subdivision # 1. Alta cannot fairly be
burdened with an implied legal duty to supply water
that Alta has no legal right to use. Nor can it fairly
be said that Alta has denied to any person the equal
protection of its laws simply because it has failed to
supply what it does not have the legal right to supply.

It is Salt Lake City, not Alta, that holds the right and
exercises the power.
If a duty to supply water exists, that duty must devolve
upon the entity with legal right to, and lawful control of
the water that may be physically available to the Haiks'
property-Salt Lake City. 19
The Court then turned to the Haiks' claims against Salt
Lake City. The Hailes asserted "no duty on the part of Salt
Lake City to supply water to the Albion Basin property"
20

as their property was beyond the city limits. However,
the city could supply surplus water if it chose to do so, but
the city was not required to do so.
The Hailes argued that the refusal by the city to provide
water breached the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. Judge Jenkins rejected this claim, finding that
"the Hailes have failed to establish that Salt Lake City
has breached any duty reasonably to give or refuse
consent, whether under the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing, or otherwise." 21 The Court also
rejected the Haiks' equal protection claim against the city,
finding that "[t]he equal pro~tion yardstick is simply
not available to measure Salt Lake City's exercise of its
contractual power to consent pursuant to ... the Water
Supply Agreement." 22

*4 Judge Jenkins also rejected the Hai.ks' takin::,as claim'
stating:
The Hai.ks still have in October
of 1997 what they purchased from
Marvin Melville in October of 1994:
lots in Albion Basin Subdivision
# 1 with appurtenant water rights
limited to 50 gallons per day per
unit under the 1963 agreement.
They retain the full bundle of
property rights they purchased. And
notwithstanding the Haiks' assertion
that at the time of annexation,
Albion Basin property owners had
a right to expect that they would
be able to build homes on their
land, they still lack one strand of
the bundle that their predecessor
in interest also did not have: a
legal right to use water in an
amount sufficient to satisfy the
health department requirement of
400 gallons per day per unit.
The Haiks cannot build on their
property, not because Alta or Salt
Lake City have changed the rules,
but rather because the rules remain
the same. 23
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed Judge
Jenkins' summary judgment ruling in all respects. 24
On Plaintiffs' equal protection challenge, the Tenth
Circuit held that " '[t]he interest in water for real estate
development is not a fundamental right.' " 25 Thus, to
overcome Plaintiffs' challenge, Alta and Salt Lake City
needed only "some rational relation to a legitimate state
interest." 26 The Tenth Circuit found that Alta had a
legitimate interest in refusing to extend its water lines
to the Hai.ks' property, namely not breaching the 1976
Water Supply Agreement. "Thus, while Alta may have the
physical capacity to supply water to the Haiks' lots, it does
not have the legal right to do so, and to compel Alta to
breach its contract would be unreasonable." 27 The Tenth
Circuit further found that "Salt Lake City has a legitimate
interest in preserving its watershed" and that "[t]he Hai.ks
failed to establish that Salt Lake City's refusal to consent
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to the extension of Alta's water lines to their property as
irrational or arbitrary."

28

In short, Alta and Salt Lake City proffer they had to
draw the line somewhere, and chose to do so in the
1976 Agreement at Alta's 1976 town boundaries. They
do not claim to be seeking to stop all development in
the canyon, or even all development in Alta for that
matter. Rather, their purported objective is to curtail
further environmentally harmful development outside
Alta's 1976 town boundaries. Line-drawing inevitably
requires that some persons who have an almost equally
strong claim to favored treatment be placed on different
sides of the lines. [That] the line might have been drawn
differently at some points is not a matter for judicial
consideration. 29
The Tenth Circuit also rejected Plaintiffs' takings claim.
The Haiks cannot maintain a taking claim because
they did not have a protectable interest in property
that was taken or damaged by Alta's denial of a
building permit. Alta's denial of a building permit was
based on the health department requirement of 400
gallons of water per day per unit, which the Haiks did
not meet. 30
*5 Around the same time as this litigation was occurring
in this Court, Salt Lake City filed certain change
applications with the State Engineer that are at the center
of Plaintiffs' Complaint here.
Under Utah law, a person entitled to use water may
change a point of diversion, place of use, or purpose of
water use by filing a change application with the State
Engineer. 31 If certain requirements are met, the State
Engineer may approve a change application. 32 However,
the State Engineer has no authority to determine the rights
of parties, and proceedings before the State Engineer do
not constitute adjudications of water rights. 33

If an application is granted, the person is authorized to
proceed with the construction of necessary works, take
any steps required to apply the water to the use named in
34

the application, and perfect the proposed application.
Within the time set out by the State Engineer, the
applicant must construct any necessary works, apply the
water to beneficial use, and file proof with the State

Engineer. 35 The State Engineer may extend the time
required to construct necessary works and put the water
to beneficial use. 36 If the State Engineer is satisfied that
the application has been perfected and the water has been
put to beneficial use, the state engineer will issue a change
certificate. 37 Applicants may withdraw their application
or simply let it lapse. 38
At issue here are certain change applications filed by
Salt Lake City: applications a16846 and a16844. These
applications were approved by the State Engineer and
have been extended. However, there is nothing in the
record to suggest that the applications have been perfected
or that a certificate of change has been issued.
The change applications become important because Judge
Jenkins, as part of the summary judgment process,
"requested the submission of additional data concerning
water availability." 39 Defendants did not disclose the
change applications in their response to Judge Jenkins.
However, Salt Lake City did disclose the water quantities
it had committed by contract to the Alta and Albion
Basin areas. In its submission, Salt Lake City noted "that
the decision to refuse to deliver water [to the Haiks] was
not primarily based upon availability but rather upon the
terms of the Water Sales Agreement and sound watershed
management and water quality practices ." 40
In September 2010, Plaintiff Mark Haik applied to the Salt
Lake Valley Health Department for waste water system
approval for single family residences in the Albion Basin
Subdivision, and also filed an application with the Town
of Alta for a building pennit. In response, Defendant
Niermeyer, the Director of Salt Lake City's Department
of Public Utilities, sent a letter to the Salt Lake Valley
Heath Department and the Town Administrator of Alta,
Defendant Guldner, in which he stated:
The Albion Basin Subdivision is currently allowed
water use under a water Agreement dated May 22,
1963 between Canyonlands, Inc. and Salt Lake City
as the successor in interest to the Little Cottonwood
Water Company. The amount of water allowed under
the contract cannot exceed 50 gallons per day per
connection.
*6 Mr. Haik has requested certification of water
for the two above-noted properties.... Based on our
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understanding of the State requirement of 400 gpd,
and Fire Department requirement of 1750 gpm ... the
contracted amount is insufficient to meet the current

District Court for the District of Utah, and the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals, that amount is insufficient to
allow for development.

standards for water supply. 41

Based on this simple fact, all of Plaintiffs' claims fail and
On December 13, 2011, the Salt Lake Valley Heath
Department denied Plaintiffs' applications for waste water
systems finding, in part, that Plaintiffs were unable to
show a sufficient water supply. This decision was upheld

Defendants' Motions to Dismiss must be granted. Though
the Court could simply grant Defendants' Motion on this
ground, the other arguments presented by Defendants
provide additional grounds to warrant dismissal.

by a hearing officer on October 24, 2012. 42
The following day, Plaintiffs brought this action.
Plaintiffs' Complaint contains the following claims: (1)
an action to set aside judgment; (2) violation of equal
protection; (3) violation of substantive due process; (4)
violation of procedural due process; (5) misrepresentation;
and (6) civil conspiracy.

Ill. DISCUSSION
All of Plaintiffs' claims center around the change
applications. Plaintiffs argue that the change applications
show that water is available and should be provided
to them. Plaintiffs argue that, by failing to disclose
or intentionally withholding information about the
change applications, Defendants engaged in all sorts of
malfeasance. Thus, in order for any of Plaintiffs' claims
to succeed, Plaintiffs must show that they are entitled to
water and that Defendants have refused to provide water
to which they are entitled.
Unfortunately for Plaintiffs, they cannot make this
showing. Alta has refused to provide water because it
cannot do so under its contract with Salt Lake City.
The city, in turn, has declined to provide water based
on the 1963 Agreement and to further its interest in the
protection of the watershed.
Plaintiffs point to the change applications to rebut the
reasons put forth by Alta and Salt Lake City, but
Plaintiffs have failed to provide any allegations that the
change applications entitle them to water. While the
change applications may show some future ability for
Salt Lake City to provide water to the Albion Basin
Subdivision, there is no obligation to do so. The only
water right that Plaintiffs have shown is set forth in the
1963 Agreement. As has been stated by the Salt Lake
Valley Health Department, the Utah Supreme Court, the

A. RES TIJDICATA
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' claims are largely
barred by res judicata. "The doctrine of res judicata
embraces two distinct branches: claim preclusion and
issue preclusion." 43 "Claim preclusion involves the same
parties or their privies and also the same cause of action,
and this precludes the relitigation of all issues that could
have been litigated as well as those that were, in fact,
litigated in the prior action." 44 "Issue preclusion, on the
other hand, arises from a different cause of action and
prevents parties or their privies from relitigating facts and
issues in the second suit that were frilly litigated in the first
suit." 45
*7 In order for claim preclusion to bar a subsequent
cause of action, the following requirements must be met:
(1) both cases must involve the same parties or their
privies; (2) the claim that is alleged to be barred must have
been presented in the first suit or must be one that could
and should have been raised in the first action; and (3)
the first suit must have resulted in a fmal judgment on the
merits. 46
Issue preclusion applies when the following four elements
are met: (1) the party against whom issue preclusion is
asserted must have been a party to, or in privity with, a
party to the prior adjudication; (2) the issue decided in the
prior adjudication must be identical to the one presented
in the instant action; (3) the issue in the first action must
have been completely, fully, and fairly litigated; and (4)
the first suit must have resulted in a fmaljudgment on the
merits. 47

In this case, the amount of water to which Plaintiffs are
entitled under the 1963 Agreement, as well as the majority
of the constitutional claims, have been decided and are
barred by res judicata. Therefore, they must be dismissed.
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Plaintiffs argue that res judicata does not apply because
of a change in circumstance. However, the only difference
between this case and the prior cases involving Plaintiffs
or their privies is the change applications. As discussed,
the State Engineer has no authority to determine the rights
of parties, and proceedings before the State Engineer do
not constitute adjudications of water rights. Thus, there
is nothing in the change applications that either entitles
Plaintiffs to water or requires Defendants to provide that
water. Plaintiffs' only claim to water is the same as it has
always been. Therefore, Plaintiffs' claims are barred.

B. ACTION TO SET ASIDE JUDGMENT
Plaintiffs bring an independent action to set aside
judgment pursuant to F ed.R. Civ .P. 60(d)(l) and (3). Rule
60(d)(l) and (3) provide that the rule does not limit a
court's power to entertain an independent action to relieve
a party from a judgment, or set aside a judgment for fraud
on the court.

Beggerly, where a party failed to make a full disclosure to
the court. The Supreme Court found that such conduct
did not meet the "demanding standard" required for an
independent action to set aside judgment. The same can
be said here. Therefore, Plaintiffs have failed to show that
setting aside the judgment is necessary to prevent a grave
miscarriage of justice.

2. Rule 60(d)(3)
Plaintiffs further allege fraud on the court.

Fraud on the court ... is fraud which
is directed to the judicial machinery
itself and is not fraud between the
parties or fraudulent documents,
false statements or perjury. It
has been held that allegations of
nondisclosure in pretrial discovery
will not support an action for fraud
on the court. It is thus fraud ... where
the impartial functions of the court
have been directly corrupted. 52

1. Rule 60(d) (J)
Plaintiffs bring an independent action under Rule 60(d).

In United States v. Beggerly, 48 the United States Supreme
Court held that "[i]ndependent actions must .. . be
reserved for those cases of 'injustices which, in certain
circumstances, are deemed sufficiently gross to demand
a departure' from rigid adherence to the doctrine of
res judicata." 49 Thus, "an independent action should
be available only to prevent a grave miscarriage of
justice." so In Beggerly, the Court found that a party
failing to make a full disclosure to the trial court did "not
nearly approach this demanding standard." 51

In this case, Plaintiffs' plausible allegations state
that Defendants failed to provide allegedly relevant
information to the Court, specifically the existence of the
change applications. As stated, the change applications do
not grant Plaintiffs any water rights and do not impose
upon Defendants any duty to provide Plaintiffs water.
Therefore, the relevance of such information to the earlier
proceedings in this Court is minimal.
*8 Even taking as true Plaintiffs' allegation that
Defendants withheld this information, such an allegation
does not meet the high burden necessary to bring an
independent action. This case is similar to the facts of

The Tenth Circuit has stated:
Generally speaking, only the most
egregious misconduct, such as
bribery of a judge or members
of a jury, or the fabrication of
evidence by a party in which an
attorney is implicated will constitute
a fraud on the court. Less egregious
misconduct, such as nondisclosure
to the court of facts allegedly
pertinent to the matter before it, will
not ordinarily rise to the level of
fraud on the court. 53
The court has further stated:
We think it clear that "fraud
on the court," whatever else it
embodies, requires a showing that
one has acted with an intent to
deceive or defraud the court. A
proper balance between the interests
underlying finality on the one
hand and allowing relief due to
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inequitable conduct on the other
makes it essential that there be a
showing of conscious wrongdoingwhat can properly be characterized
as a deliberate scheme to defraudbefore relief from a final judgment
is appropriate under the HazelAtlas standard. Thus, when there is
no intent to deceive, the fact that
misrepresentations were made to a
court is not of itself a sufficient basis
for setting aside a judgment under

*9 Plaintiffs' Complaint fails to meet these pleading
standards. Plaintiffs make the conclusory allegation that
they are similarly situated to other landowners. However,
there are not sufficient factual allegations to support
these conclusory statements. Further, Plaintiffs' equal
protection claim fails because Plaintiffs cannot show that
any differential treatment was without a rational basis.
As has been held by this Court and the Tenth Circuit,
there are legitimate reasons to deny Plaintiffs' requests
for water rights: compliance with contract provisions and
protection of the watershed.

the guise of "fraud on the court." 54

Plaintiffs point to a provision of the Utah constitution and
two decisions from the Utah Supreme Court in support
of their argument, but they are not helpful. Plaintiffs rely
on Article XI, Section 6 of the Utah constitution. That
provision states that municipalities are forbidden from
leasing, selling, alienating, or disposing their waterworks,
water rights, or sources of water supply, but that such may
be used to supply its inhabitants with water at reasonable
charges. Next, Plaintiffs cite to County Water System, Inc.

Fraud upon the court must be proven by clear and
convincing evidence. 55
In this case, the Court is presented with, at most,
nondisclosure of facts allegedly pertinent to the case
before Judge Jenkins. The Tenth Circuit has made clear
that such misconduct does not ordinarily rise to the level
of fraud on_ the Court. Though Plaintiffs do their best to
impute an evil intent to Defendants, their allegations falls
short of what is required to substantiate a claim of fraud
on the Court. Therefore, this claim must be dismissed.

C. CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS
1. Equal Protection
Plaintiffs appear to assert a class-of-one theory. To
prevail under a class-of-one theory, "a plaintiff must
first establish that others, 'similarly situated in every

material respect' were treated differently." 56 "A plaintiff
must then show this difference in treatment was
without rational basis, that is, the government action
was irrational and abusive and wholly unrelated to
any legitimate state activity." 57 The Tenth Circuit
has "recognized a substantial burden that plaintiffs
demonstrate others similarly situated in all material
respects were treated differently and that there is no
objectively reasonable basis for the defendant's action." 58
The Tenth Circuit has also recently clarified that, under
Twombly and Iqbal, a plaintiff must meet this "substantial
burden" by offering "enough specific factual allegations
to 'nudge[] their claims across the line from conceivable
to plausible.' " 59

v. Salt Lake City, 60 where the Utah Supreme court held
that Salt Lake City may sell and distribute surplus water
beyond its corporate limits. 61 Finally, Plaintiffs cite Platt
v. Town of Torrey, 62 which stands for the proposition that
municipalities must deal reasonably with nonresidents

who purchase surplus water from the municipality. 63
Plaintiffs read these together as requiring the city to
provide water to them, especially in light of the change
applications which, if perfected, would allow the city
to do so. However, Plaintiffs read too much into this
constitutional provision and these two cases. When read
together, these statements do not require the city to
provide water to Plaintiffs, they merely permit the city
to do so and, if the city so chooses, a reasonableness
requirement is imposed. Nor do these provisions stand
for the proposition that the city cannot have legitimate
reasons (such as the protection of the watershed) to
decline to supply water to nonresidents. Therefore, these
provisions are not helpful to Plaintiffs and do not save this
claim from dismissal.

2. Substantive Due Process
"Substantive due process bars 'certain government
actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures

used to implement them.' " 64 "Executive action violates
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substantive due process when it 'can properly be
characterized as arbitrary, or conscience shocking, in a
constitutional sense.'" 65
Plaintiffs' Complaint falls well short of this standard. All
that Plaintiffs' allegations reveal is that Sal~ Lake City
and Alta have consistently taken the same position toward
Plaintiffs. That is, Alta has refused to extend its water
lines to Plaintiffs' property, because it is barred from doing
so by its agreement with Salt Lake City, and Salt Lake
City has consistently refused Plaintiffs' requests for water.
Plaintiffs have failed to provide anything showing that the
city cannot so refuse. As Plaintiffs have failed to establish
any right to water, and indeed several courts have detailed
exactly why Plaintiffs do not have any such right, there
is nothing about the Defendants' actions that shock the
conscience.

3. Procedural Due Process
*10 "To assess whether an individual was denied
procedural due process, courts must engage in a two-step
inquiry: ( 1) did the individual possess a protected interest
such that the due process protections were applicable; and,
if so, then (2) was the individual afforded an appropriate

level of process." 66
As is detailed above, Plaintiffs and their predecessor
in interest have been afforded an appropriate level of
process. Plaintiffs have repeatedly requested and been
denied water sufficient to allow for the development of
their property. Their latest request was denied by the
Salt Lake Valley Health Department. That denial was
subsequently upheld by a hearing officer. In addition
to being heard by state administrative bodies, Plaintiffs'
disputes have wound their way through the state and
federal court systems. At every step, Plaintiffs have
been given the ability to fully litigate their claims. As a
result, Plaintiffs' allegations that they have been denied
procedural due process are not plausible.
As Plaintiffs have not shown a violation of their
constitutional rights, let alone one that is clearly
established, the individual Defendants are entitled to
qualified immunity.

Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Guldner, Alta's Town
Administrator, made false statements to owners of land
in the Albion Basin Subdivision in 1993 concerning the
availability of water to service the Albion Basin. Similarly,
Plaintiffs complain of statements made by city attorneys
to this Court. Finally, Plaintiffs take issue with the
statements made by Defendant Niermeyer in his May
23, 2011 letter. Plaintiffs allege that these various actions
constitute civil conspiracy and misrepresentation. 67
"To prove a civil conspiracy, plaintiff must show the
following elements: (I) a combination of two or more
persons, (2) an object to be accomplished, (3) a meeting
of the minds on the object or course of action, (4) one or
more unlawful, overt acts, and (5) damages as a proximate
result thereof." 68
To state a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation,
Plaintiffs must allege:
(1) that a representation was made
(2) concerning a presently existing

material fact (3) which was false
and (4) which the representor either
(a) knew to be false or (b) made
recklessly, knowing that there was
insufficient knowledge upon which
to base such a representation, (5) for
the purpose of inducing the other
party to act upon it and (6) that the
other party, acting reasonably and
in ignorance of its falsity, (7) did in
fact rely upon it (8) and was thereby
induced to act (9) to that party's
injury and damage . 69
For substantially the same reasons stated above with
regard to Plaintiffs' other claims, these claims too must
fail. Simply stated, Plaintiffs can point to no unlawful
acts or misrepresentations by Defendants. Further, these
claims would be barred for various reasons under the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act. Therefore, these claims
must be dismissed.

E. ATTORNEY'S FEES

D. CML CONSPIRACY AND
MISREPRESENTATION

*11 In addition to seeking dismissal, Defendants Salt
Lake City and the Town of Alta seek attorney fees
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927. However, Defendants do
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not provide any discussion or analysis on this issue. While
attorney fees may be warranted in this case, without
.further analysis on this point, Defendants' request must be
denied at this time.

ORDERED that Defendants1 Motions to Dismiss
(Docket Nos. 26, 28, and 30) are GRANTED. Plaintiffs'
Complaint is dismissed with prejudice.

All Citations

IV. CONCLUSION

Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2013 WL 968141
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SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, a municipal
corporation; Town of Alta, a municipal corporation;
JefferyT. Niermeyer, an individual; and John
Guldner, an individual, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 13-4050.

I
June 5, 2014.
Synopsis

Background: Property owners brought action against city,
alleging that city's continuing denial of water to property
was unlawful based on several new or newly discovered
facts. The United States District Court for the District
of Utah, Ted Stewart, J., 2013 WL 968141, dismissed
complaint. Property owners appealed.

Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Gregory A. Phillips,
Circuit Judge, held that:
[1] owners' due process claims against city were precluded
under doctrine of issue preclusion;
[2] allegations against city failed to state equal protection
claim;
[3] owners' civil conspiracy claims against city and town
were precluded under doctrine of claim preclusion; and
[4] owners' allegations against city and town failed to state
claim for fraudulent misrepresentation.

ORDER AND JUDGMENT **
GREGORY A. PHILLIPS, Circuit Judge.
This appeal marks just one chapter in an ongoing saga
over the municipal supply of water to property owned
by Mark and Raymond Haik in Alta, Utah. In 1996, the
Haiks sued the Town of Alta and Salt Lake City in an
attempt to force either or both municipalities to extend
water service to their lots. See Haik v. Town of Alta, No.
97-4202, 1999 WL 190717, at *I (10th Cir. Apr. 5, 1999)
[hereinafter Haik I]. The Hailes lost on summary judgment
and we affirmed on appeal, concluding that the Haiks
lacked an affirmative right. to water and that Alta and
Salt Lake City had acted reasonably in refusing to supply
it. See generally id. Now the Haiks are before us again,
appealing the district court's dismissal of their newest
complaint, which alleges that Salt Lake City's continuing
denial of water is unlawful based on several new or newly
discovered facts. The issue is whether the Haiks' new
allegations state plausible claims for relief in light of the
preclusive effect of Haik L They do not.

FACTS
1. Events Leading to Haile I

In 1994, the Hailes purchased four undeveloped lots in
the Albion Basin Subdivision, located at the top of the
Little Cottonwood Canyon, east of Salt Lake City, Utah.
The Haiks wanted to develop their lots but were unable
to do so because of inadequate water supply. At the
time, and apparently to this day, the Board. of Health

\f:{S.ST'LA.W © 20 i 6 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

l-~.

~

Haik v. Salt Lake City Corp., 567 Fed.Appx. 621 (2014)

requires landowners to show an entitlement to 400 gallons
of water per day to receive a building permit. When
the *624 Hailes purchased their property, however, they
succeeded to a right to just 50 gallons of water per day
under a preexisting contract with the Little Cottonwood
Water Company. No other water rights came with the
property. 1
The Haiks nonetheless believed they were entitled to more
water because their lots fell within Alta's town limits.
They contacted Alta to arrange for water service, but
soon learned that Alta has no independent rights to
the water at issue. Instead, Alta purchases Salt Lake
City's surplus water according to an intergovernmental
agreement from 1976 (Water Supply Agreement). The
Water Supply Agreement grants Alta a good amount of
water to do with as it pleases, but it restricts Alta's ability
to extend water to properties outside then-existing town
limits without first receiving ~e consent of Salt Lake City.
The Albion Basin Subdivision falls outside the 1976 limits,
thereby necessitating Salt Lake City's pre-approval for
water service.Yet when the Haiks inquired, Salt Lake City
declined to consent to the extension of water service to
their lots. As a result, Alta denied the relevant building
permits, leaving the Haiks high and dry.

2.Haikl
The Hailes sued Alta and Salt Lake City, asserting
equal-protection claims against both municipalities. They
further asserted an unconstitutional "taking" claim
against Alta and alleged that Salt Lake City's refusal to
consent under the Water Supply Agreement violated the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. They also
alleged that Alta had a municipal duty to provide water
to the Albion Basin because Alta annexed the subdivision
in 1981.
The district court rejected the Haiks' claims on summary
judgment. The court found that Alta had no obligation to
supply water to the Hailes because, even though Alta may
have had the physical ability to supply water to the Albion
B~in Subdivision, it lacked the legal ability to do so (at
least unilaterally) under the Water Supply Agreement. Put
another way, the only water truly "available" to Alta was
that granted by Salt Lake City.
Alta's annexation of the Albion Basin did not change this
reality. Even though a municipality owes a general duty

to supply water under the Utah Constitution, the district
court observed that this duty "presupposes that the water
to be supplied to inhabitants has already been lawfully
acquired by the municipality." App. at 310. In this
instance, Alta had not acquired the right to supply water
outside its 1976 limits absent Salt Lake City's consent.
Further, the court said there was no unconstitutional
talcing of the Haiks' property because the Haiks still had
in October of 1997 what they purchased in 1994: "lots
in Albion Basin Subdivision # 1 with appurtenant water
rights limited to 50 gallons per day per unit." App. at 316.
The court similarly concluded that Salt Lake City's actions
were justified. Nothing compelled Salt Lake City to
consent to the supply of water beyond Alta's 1976 limits,
and Salt Lake City had no legal duty to supply water to
people outside its own city limits. Notably, the district
court did not believe that the Hajks could even *625
maintain an equal protection claim against Salt Lake City,
because the city's actions were proprietary rather than
administrative.
The Hailes appealed the district court's dismissal of the
equal-protection and taking claims. Haik L 1999 WL
190717, at *2.
On appeal, we assumed the Hailes could maintain equalprotection claims against both Alta and Salt Lake City
but emphasized that the interest in water for real-estate
development is not a fundamental right. Id at *3. As
a result, Alta and Salt Lake City's actions were subject
to rational-basis review, meaning they only needed to be
"rationally related to a legitimate end." Id In our view,
the actions of both municipalities satisfied this standard.
Alta, for one, had good reason to deny water to the Haiks
since the town would have violated the Water Supply
Agreement had it extended water without Salt Lake City's
consent. See id at *4. Salt Lake City, in tum, could
refuse consent under the Water Supply Agreement given
its legitimate interest in watershed preservation. See id
The Hailes challenged Salt Lake City's stated preservation
interest, citing examples of other people in the area who
were receiving water. See id At the time, it was indeed true
that Salt Lake City had consented to allow water to others
outside Alta's 1976 limits. See id. In those cases, however,
Salt Lake City had allowed water for snowmaking-one
of the uses listed in a 1991 city ordinance governing
new watershed permits, Ordinance 17.04.020. See id We
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believed it was rational for Salt Lake City to determine
that uses listed in Ordinance 17.04.020 would not result in
significant harm to the watershed, whereas other new uses
outside the 1976 limits might. Id. As for the examples of
water use within Alta's 1976 limits, those did not require
Salt Lake City1s consent and, to the extent the Hailes
challenged this feature of the Water Supply Agreement
itself, we saw nothing wrong with Salt Lake City1s giving
Alta carte blanche to supply water within the 1976
limits but refusing to do so beyond. See id at *5. The
municipalities had to draw the line somewhere in light of
their purported desire to curb harmful development. Id
As for the Haiks' taking claim against Alta, it failed on
appeal for the same reasons announced by the district
court. See id at *6-7. We too believed the Haiks retained
the "full 'bundle' of property rights" they had originally
purchased. See id.

3. The Hailes' Current Complaint
In their current 115-page complaint, the Haiks allege
several new or newly discovered facts:
Approved Change Applications. According to the current
complaint, Salt Lake City filed over a dozen applications
in the early 1990s to get approval from the State Engineer
to make certain changes in water use. The Haiks base
their new allegations on Change Application a16846 in
particular, in which Salt Lake City sought to change the
point of diversion and place of use for up to 15.75 acre-feet
of water annually to serve the Albion Basin Subdivision.
The Utah State Engineer approved the application in
1997 while Haik I was still pending. The Haiks allege this
resulted in two things: (1) Salt Lake City could provide
more than 400 gallons of water per day to each of the
Haiks' lots; and (2) the Albion Basin Subdivision became
a part of Salt Lake City's water "service area." App. at 40,
1164; App. at 42-43, ,r 175. According to the complaint,
however, neither Salt Lake City nor Alta mentioned these
allegedly relevant facts during Haik I. Instead, the Haiks
say that they learned about the approved change *626
applications in 2007 after a neighbor came upon the
records.
Second Round of Permit Denials and Niermeyer Letter.
Upon learning of the State Engineer's approval of Change
Application al 6846, the Hailes sought the necessary
development permits for a second time. Salt Lake City
and Alta authorities, including Alta Town Administrator

John Guldner, denied them once again. For this, the Haiks
partly blame Jeffry Niermeyer, the Director of Salt Lake
City's Department of Public Utilities, who told permitting
authorities that the Hai.ks were entitled to only 50 gallons
of water per day under the Little Cottonwood contract.
The Haiks claim this was a lie because, as Niermeyer knew,
the Little Cottonwood contract had long been defunct.
They allege that the real reason behind Niermeyer's letter
was Salt Lake City's longstanding promise to Alta that city
officials would use their "watershed management muscle"
to help Alta stop development in the area. App. at 22,174.

Water Bills to the Albion Basin Subdivision. The Hailes
also allege that, since Haile I, they have discovered that
Salt Lake City has been billing a number of homes in
the Albion Basin Subdivision for water in unmetered
amounts. The Hailes claim this shows that Salt Lake City
is treating them differently from others within the Albion
Basin Subdivision without reason.
Salt Lake City1s Approval of Water Supply to New SingleFamily Residences. The Haiks further allege that Salt Lake
City has repeatedly consented to supply water to similarly
situated people in the surrounding watershed canyons.
Some of the Haiks alleged examples of differential
treatment predate Haik I, and some do not.
1

Current Claims. The Hailes seek to set aside the judgment
in Haik I based on Salt Lake City and Alta's alleged
concealment of the change applications. They also claim
that Salt Lake City and Alta misrepresented to the district
court in Haile I that no water was available to meet the
domestic requirements of the Haiks' lots. Additionally, the
Haiks raise the following substantive claims: (1) violation
of equal protection under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Salt
Lake City; (2) violation of equal protection under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 against Jeffry Niermeyer (in his personal
capacity); (3) violation of substantive due process under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Salt Lake City; (4) violation of
procedural due process under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Salt
Lake City; (5) misrepresentation against Salt Lake City,
Jeffry Niermeyer, Alta, and John Guldner; and (6) civil
conspiracy against Salt Lake City and Alta.

4. The District Court's Dismissal
After considering the Haiks' new allegations, the district
court granted the defendants1 motion to dismiss under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Haik v.
Salt Lake City Corp., No. 2:12-CV-997 TS, 2013 WL
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968141, at *1 (D.Utah Mar. 12, 2013). The Hailes' attempt
to set aside the judgment in Haik I failed because the
district court found that the alleged misconduct fell short
of the high standard for relief under Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 60(d)(l) and 60(d)(3). See id at *7-8. As for
the Haiks' newly alleged claims, the district court believed
that nothmg of significance had changed since Haik I and
that the majority of the Hailes' claims had already been
decided. See id at *7. Alternatively, the court concluded
that the Hailes' allegations were implausible. See id. at *810.

DISCUSSION
On appeal, the Hailes argue that their new and improved
allegations state plausible *627 claims for relief. We
disagree. Nothing in the current complaint changes the
legal landscape or position of the parties since Haik I or
otherwise states a claim for relief. We discuss each of the
Haiks' newly alleged claims in tum, leaving until last our
discussion of their attempt to set aside the judgment in
Haik I

1. Standard of Review Under Rule 12(b)(6)
We review de novo the dismissal of a complaint under
Rule 12(b)(6). Diversey v. Schmidly, 738 F.3d 1196, 1199
(10th Cir.2013). In doing so, we accept as true all wellpleaded factual allegations. Schrock v. Wyeth, Inc., 727
F.3d 1273, 1280 (10th Cir.2013) (internal quotation marks
omitted). We then ask whether the complaint contains
"enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,570,127
S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). "A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d
868 (2009).

1. Preclusion
This case is unusual in that it follows a previous lawsuit
involving several of the same parties, many similar
allegations, and the same principal demand for relief.
For this reason, we take a moment to discuss the twin
doctrines of res judicata--claim preclusion and issue
preclusion. "Under the doctrine of claim preclusion, a
fmal judgment forecloses successive litigation of the very

\1i*Tl~:.W

same claim, whether or not relitigation of the claim raises
the same issues as the earlier suit." Taylor v. Sturgell, 553
U.S. 880, 892, 128 S.Ct. 2161, 171 L.Ed.2d 155 (2008)
(internal quotation marks omitted). "Issue preclusion,
in contrast, bars successive litigation of an issue of fact
or law actually litigated and resolved in a valid court
determination essential to the prior judgment, even if
the issue recurs in the context of a different claim." Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted). The doctrines serve
the defendant's interest in avoiding repeat lawsuits as
well as the court's interest in avoiding a waste of judicial
resources. Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. 392, 412, 120
S.Ct. 2304, 147 L.Ed.2d 374 (2000). The application ofres
judicata is a pure question of law reviewed de novo. Pelt
v. Utah, 539 F.3d 1271, 1280 (10th Cir.2008).
Claim preclusion and issue preclusion are often difficult
to apply in practice, and this case is no exception. The
district court did not go too deep into the matter and
simply concluded that the Hailes' rights and "the majority
of the constitutional claims" had already been decided,
without specifying which doctrine applied to what claims.
App. at 280. On appeal, Appellees' arguments are similarly
general. They argue that claim preclusion bars all of
the current claims because the material facts have not
changed since Haik L From their perspective, the Haiks'
claims either have been decided or should have been raised
before.
[1] While we agree that the material facts from Haik I
are unchange~ the preclusive effect of that judgment is
more complicated. Even if the material facts are the same,
the Haiks may still bring a lawsuit against Alta and Salt
Lake City based on entirely new facts not part of the
last cause of action. See Hatch v. Boulder Town Cowicil,
471 F.3d 1142, 1150 (10th Cir.2006) ("[A] new action will
be permitted only where it raises new and independent
claims, not part of the previous transaction, based on
the new facts." (emphasis in original)). Though many of
the Haiks' *628 presently alleged facts are similar to
those alleged before, we still believe at least some are new,
and these new allegations are enough to make the Hailes'
equal-protection and misrepresentation claims different
for purposes of claim preclusion. The allegations still fail,
but they fail under Rule 12(b)(6). The civil-conspiracy
claim, however, is barred.
As for the Hailes' due-process claims, we think issue
preclusion is the more applicable doctrine. While
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Appellees do not argue that issue preclusion applies on
appeal, we are on notice of the issues we decided in
Haik I and believe this is an appropriate circumstance
in which to raise the doctrine sua sponte. See Arizona,
530 U.S. at 412, 120 S.Ct. 2304 ("[I]f a court is on notice
that it has previously decided the issue presented, the
court may dismiss the action sua sponte, even though the
defense has not been raised."). The Hailes have briefed the
applicability of res judicata generally and have argued that
the issues decided in Haik I are not identical to the issues
here.

3. The Due-Process • aims Against
Salt Lake City Are Barred by Haik I
[2] Generally, to state either a procedural or substantive
due-process claim, a plaintiff must first prove that the
defendant's actions deprived the plaintiff of a protected
property interest. Hyde Park Co. v. Santa Fe City Council,
226 F.3d 1207, 1210 & n. 2 (10th Cir.2000). The Hailes did
not raise due-process claims against Salt Lake City in Haik
I, but they did raise a taking claim against the Town of
Alta. See Haile I, 1999 WL 190717, at *6. In concluding
that the Hailes could not maintain this claim, we reasoned
that Alta's denial of a building permit did not deprive
the Haiks of anything they had before; they "retain[ed]
the full bundle of property rights they purchased." Id
(internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, we said
the "mere expectation of municipal water service in the
future" is not "property subject to taking." Id at *7. In
short, the Hailes' taking claim failed "because they did not
have a protectable interest in property." Id
Issue preclusion "bars a party from relitigating an issue
once it has suffered an adverse determination on the
issue, even if the issue arises when the party is pursuing
or defending against a different claim." 2 Moss v. Kopp,
559 F.3d 1155, 1161 (10th Cir.2009). Here, the Hailes
previously suffered an adverse determination on the very
issue that is now critical to their due-process claims-that
is, whether the denial of the development permits deprived
them of a protected property interest. True, the Haiks
previously argued that Alta deprived them of this interest
by denying the permits, whereas now they allege that Salt
Lake City deprived them of their interest by interfering
with the permitting process (by way of the Niermeyer
letter). But thls is a difference without a distinction. The
very same question remains: Do the Hailes have any
protected interest in the building permits, or, to put a finer

point on it, in the water on which those permits depend?
We said "no" before and are not inclined to *629 give the
Hailes a second opportunity to litigate this issue.
Nonetheless, the Hailes argue that our answer this time
around should be "yes." After Haik I, they believe
they acquired a protected property interest when the
State Engineer-unbeknownst to them-approved the
change applications identified in the complaint. The
Hailes characterize this discovery as a change in "material
operative fact." Appellants' Br. at 43. And they claim it is
this new fact that gives rise to new issues not previously
adjudicated. But because we disagree with the Haiks'
premise, we must disagree with their conclusion as well.
The change applications simply do not matter.
To begin with, we reject the notion that a protected
property interest arose with the mere approval of Change
Application al 6846 or any other change application. 3
Under Utah law, a change application allows "a person
entitled to the use of water" to seek permission to change
"the point of diversion; place of use; or purpose of use for
which the water was originally appropriated." Utah Code
Ann. § 73-3-3(2)(a). "If an application is approved, the
applicant may ... perfect the proposed application," id §
73-3-10(3)(c) (emphasis added), at which time the State
Engineer issues a certificate of appropriation. Id § 733-17. Nothing about this process requires the successful
applicant to perfect or to use the water in the manner
approved. So at most, the approved change applications
"empowered" SaJt Lake City to supply water to the Haiks'
lots. See Searle v. Milburn Irrigation Co., 133 P .3d 382, 388
(Utah 2006). But Salt Lake City already had this power in
Haik I. As was the case then, we fail to see how the city's
ability to supply water amounts to an obligation to do so
-let alone a protected property interest belonging to the
Hailes.
Still, the Hailes allege that approved Change Application
a16846 had the particular effect in this case of bringing
the Albion Basin Subdivision into Salt Lake City's service
area, thereby requiring the city to extend its municipal
water service to their lots. They believe that this triggered
rights or interests belonging to them under Article XI,
Section 6 of the Utah Constitution as well as a duty on the
part of Salt Lake City "to act reasonably in making water
sales ... as a municipal function." App. at 20, ,r 62.
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Even assuming the lots are now within the -city's service
area, this fact doesn't entitle the Haik:s to more water. To
be sure, Article XI, Section 6 of the Utah Constitution
mandates that a municipality supply water owned by it to
its inhabitants at reasonable charges. See Utah Const. art.
XI, § 6 ("[A]ll such waterworks, water rights and sources
of water supply now owned or hereafter to be acquired by
any municipal corporation, shall be preserved, maintained
and operated by it for supplying its inhabitants with water
at reasonable charges."); Platt v. Town of Torrey, 949
P.2d 325,328 (Utah 1997). But Article XI, Section 6 says
nothing of "others beyond the limits of the city," see Platt,
949 P.2d at 330 (distinguishing municipal inhabitants
from nonresidents), and just because the Haiks' lots now
fall within Salt Lake City's service area, it does not follow
that the Haiks are now Salt Lake *630 City inhabitants
as well. See id at 328 (discussing a town's obligations
to "nonresident users within its services area" (emphasis
added)). Indeed, time and again, the Haiks describe
themselves as nonresidents of Salt Lake City. See, e.g.,
App. at 99-100, 1498; Appellants' Br. at 49.
Consistent with the Utah Constitution, Utah courts do
not impose a duty on municipalities like Salt Lake City
to supply water to nonresidents like the Haiks. The
Haiks actually appear to recognize as much. Again,
they only allege that the city failed to exercise its
discretion according to the "reasonableness requirement"
articulated by the Utah Supreme Court in County Water
System. v. Salt Lake City, 3 Utah 2d 46, 278 P.2d 285
(1954), and Platt v. Town of Torrey. App. at 54, 1 237.
(Complaint at 1 320, 498.) But we are not persuaded
that even this requirement applies. County Water System
simply held that Salt Lake Citys sale of surplus water
outside city limits, like its sale of water within city
limits, was not subject to regulation by the Public
Service Commission. 278 P.2d at 290-91. There, the court
recognized that the supplying of water to nonresidents
was "as much a municipal function as the supplying of
water within the city limits." Id at 290. Platt, in tum,
said that County Water System supported the rule that "a
reasonable basis must exist for the disparate treatment of
residents and nonresidents," specifically when it came to
differing water rates. 949 P.2d at 328, 330. But both cases
were concerned with the law only after a municipality
elected to supply water to nonresidents. Neither case
requires a municipality to have a reasonable basis for
refusing to supply water to nonresidents in the first place.

In fact, County Water System and Platt are consistent
with what the district court said in Haik I-that a
municipality's decision about whether to supply water to
nonresidents is entirely permissive. See Cnty. Water Sys.,
278 P.2d at 290; see also Platt, 949 P.2d at 331 (citing
favorably Schroede.r v. City of Grayville, 166 Ill.App.3d
814, 117 Ill.Dec. 681, 520 N.E.2d 1032, 1034 (1988)
("[A]lthough not obligated to serve non-residents in the
absence of a contractual relationship, a municipality is
prohibited from discriminating unreasonably in rates or
manner of service when it elects to serve non-residents."));
App. at 314 ("Salt Lake City has no legal duty to furnish
water to users outside its own city limits, be they 'similarly
situated' or not.") Utah's statutory law reinforces this
permissive approach; it "authorizes municipalities to
construct and operate 'waterworks' ... and to 'deliver the
surplus product or service capacity of any such works, not
required by the ·city or its inhabitants, to others beyond
the limits of the city.'" Platt, 949 P.2d at 330 (emphases
added) (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-14 (1996)).
The purpose of allowing the municipal sale of excess
water to people in adjacent areas is to avoid "shameful
waste," see Cnty. Water Sys., 278 P.2d at 290, not to
force municipalities to extend their water supply to every
property owner living at the top of a far-flung canyon.
Granted, we can imagine why the Haiks got their hopes
up when they learned that Salt Lake City had sought
out and received approval to supply water to the Albion
Basin Subdivision in amounts allowing for development.
In our view, however, the Haik:s' hope of more water is still
just that-a "mere expectation" that someone somewhere
might one day supply water to their lots. Haik L 1999
WL 190717, at *7. The change applications did not alter
anyone's obligations and they certainly did not give the
Haiks a protected property interest or "legitimate claim of
entitlement" to more water. Hyde Park Co., 226 F.3d at
1210.

*631 In sum, we see no reason to revisit our
determination that the Haiks lack a constitutionally
protected property interest in receiving water for their
lots. 4 While affirming on this ground does not spare
Salt Lake City the burdens it has already suffered in
responding to this lawsuit, it does honor the preclusive
effect of Haile L
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4. The Equal-Protection Allegations Against
Salt Lake City Fail to State a Oaiin

In evaluating the sufficiency of their equal-protection
allegations, the Hailes ask us to apply the two-step
inquiry from Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S.
562, 564, 120 S.Ct. 1073, 145 L.Ed.2d 1060 (2000).
In that case, the Supreme Court held that the Equal
Protection Clause gives rise to a cause of action even
if a plaintiff does not belong to a particular class or
group. See id. To prevail, such a plaintiff must allege
and prove (1) that she has been intentionally treated
differently from others similarly situated and (2) that
there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.
Id Because the Hailes do not allege class membership,
we will proceed under this general framework. 5 But we
proceed with caution, recognizing that class-of-one claims
pose a danger of "turning even quotidian exercises of
government discretion into constitutional causes." Kan..
Penn Gaming, LLC v. Collins, 656 F.3d 1210, 1216 (10th
Cir.2011).
Of course, this is not the first time the Hailes have
alleged equal-protection violations against Salt Lake City.
In Haik I, they claimed that Salt Lake City had acted
unreasonably by refusing to supply water to them while
choosing to supply water to others. See Haik I, 1999 WL
190717, at *3-4. The Hailes argue the same thing now, but
this time they say Salt Lake City really has no good reason
to continue to treat them differently. As before, the Haiks
provide examples of other people who are receiving water
while they go without.
Appellees generally argue that the Haiks' equal-protection
claim is barred because it is the same claim rejected
on the merits in Haile I We disagree. True; claim
preclusion forecloses successive litigation of the "same
claim." Taylor, 553 U.S. at 892,128 S.Ct. 2161. But claims
are only the "same" for purposes of claim preclusion
if they arise out of the same transaction or series of
connected transactions. Yapp v. Excel Corp., 186 F.3d
1222, 1227 (10th Cir.1999). In general, a transaction
"connotes a natural grouping or common nucleus of
operative facts.,, Restatement (Second) of Judgments §
24 cmt. b, at 199 (1982). Under the transactional test,
therefore, a new claim can go forward so long as it is based
on new and independent facts not part of the previous
transaction. Hatch, 471 F.3d at 1150. Here, the Haiks
allege that Salt Lake City is unfairly supplying water to

a number of new and different people in its watershed
but that Salt Lake City (through Niermeyer) *632 sent
a letter to permitting authorities in May 2011 reflecting
the city's refusal to supply water to them. The Hailes also
allege some comparators that predate Haik I, and we
agree with Salt Lake City that the Haiks should have
raised those examples before. Still, we think the new facts
(arising subsequent to the prior action) "are enough on
their own" to constitute a new claim. Id. (quoting Storey
v. Cello Holdings, LLC, 347 F.3d 370,384 (2d Cir.2003)).
Hypothetically at least, the Haiks' new allegations could
make out an equal-protection violation where none had
occurred before.
But the allegations are insufficient. Again, the
first thing a class-of-one plaintiff must establish is that
others "similarly situated in every material respect were
treated differently." Ka.n. Penn Gaming, 656 F.3d at 1216
(emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Depending on the case and the nature of the differential
treatment, the allegations necessary to establish this level
of similarity will vary. See Jennings v. City of Stillwater,
383 F.3d 1199, 1214 (10th Cir.2004). The more variables
involved in the government action at issue, the more
specifics the plaintiff will need to allege to allow for
meaningful comparison between the plaintiffs (negative)
experience and the (positive) experiences of others. See
id. at 1215. Here, the complaint fails to allege with any
specificity that the new water recipients are similar to the
Haiks.
(3]

The allegations of Salt Lake City's unmetered sale of
water to "homes 6 in Albion Basin Subdivision" warrant
separate discussion. App. at 19, 1 60. Certainly if the
Haiks alleged that Salt Lake City was supplying water to
their neighbors while denying water to them, they would
be much closer to successfully alleging that Salt Lake
City was treating them differently from others similarly
situated. We're not sure if this is what the Haiks mean
to allege since they also say that Salt Lake City treated
them and several of their neighbors differently from
others-le., the city treated people in the Albion Basin
Subdivision the same way. Regardless, the problem here
is that the Haiks do not allege that Salt Lake City denied
them the water it is evidently supplying (or at least billing)
their neighbors. Instead, the allegations are that Salt Lake
City (through Jeffry Niermeyer) told authorities that the
Hailes were only entitled to 50 gallons of water per day
under the Little Cottonwood Water contract, resulting in
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the denial of the Haiks' building permits. In the absence of
allegations that Salt Lake City took a different approach
with regard to other requests for development permits in
the neighborhood, we have no way of assessing differential
treatment.
To some extent, this apples-to-oranges problem carries
over to the other allegations of differential treatment as
well. Have the Hailes even applied for the water permits/
approvals Salt Lake City has allegedly issued to the
"similarly situated" comparators in the complaint?

In sum, the Hailes have not alleged differential treatment
that states a class-of-one equal-protection claim. We have
little forgiveness for this since we expressly considered
several things unique about the Hailes' situation in Haik
/-including the location of their property, their desired
use, and their limited contractual rights. The current
complaint does not even attempt to allege facts that might
lead us to *633 believe that the new water recipients are
similar to them in any of these respects.

5. The Civil-Conspiracy Claim Against Salt
Lake City and Alta Is Barred by Hail£ I
(4] Appellees argue that the Haiks' civil-conspiracy claim
is barred by claim preclusion. We agree. The Haiks did not
raise a state-law conspiracy claim in Haik L but we believe
that would have been the appropriate time to do so. 7 See
Strickland v. City of Albuquerque, 130 F.3d 1408, 1413
(10th Cir.1997) ("[Claim preclusion] bars claims that were
or could have been brought in the prior proceeding.").
The Haiks allege that Salt Lake City and Alta "combined
to accomplish the objective of using denial of water as
a means of controlling development within the Albion
Basin Subdivision." App. at 120, -U 620. They describe
this "policy" or "custom" of denying water service as
longstanding. App. at 22-23, ~ 74, 76. Indeed, the Hailes
trace the denials back to the early 1990s, when Salt Lake
City allegedly promised the former mayor of Alta that
it would deny water service to stop development in the
area. They also allege that Salt Lake City and Alta's
concealment of the change applications is an overt act of
the conspiracy.
We return to the transactional test. Again, it provides
that "a claim arising out of the same transaction, or
series of connected transactions as a previous suit,

which concluded in a valid and final judgment, will be
precluded." Yapp, 186 F.3d at 1227 (internal quotation
marks omitted). We normally look to the initial complaint
in determining the scope of the previous litigation and the
"transactional nexus into which facts and claims are fitted
or excluded for purposes of claim preclusion." Hatch, 471
F.3d at 1150. Even though the complaint from Haik I is
not a part of this record, we know a great deal about the
first lawsuit from the decision of the district court and our
own decision on appeal. Relevant here, we know the Haiks
previously argued that Salt Lake City and Alta were joined
in a "collusive desire to prevent any development in the
upper Albion Basin." Haik I, 1999 WL 190717, at *2. And
they claimed that Salt Lake City and Alta were working
together to deny water to them for no good reason.
It's clear that there is substantial overlap between these
facts and the allegations supporting the Haiks' current
civil-conspiracy claim. See Restatement (Second) of
Judgments § 24 CIDt. b, at 199 (1982) ("If there is a
substantial overlap, the second action should ordinarily
be held precluded.") ~ far as we can tell, the only new
allegation (apart from ongoing conspiracy) is that Alta
and Salt Lake City concealed the change applications. But
this fact alone does not set forth a "new and independent"
claim. 8 Hatch, 471 F.3d at 1150. Instead, we believe the
Hailes' civil-conspiracy *634 claim arises out of the same
transaction or series of transactions as Haile I and could
have been raised as part of the "trial unit" in that case.
Hatch, 471 F.3d at 1146; see Stone v. Dep't ofAviation, 453
F.3d 1271, 1278 (10th Cir.2006) ("A plaintifrs obligation
to bring all related claims together in the same action
arises under the common law rule of claim preclusion
prohibiting the splitting of actions."). The claim was
properly dismissed for this reason.
Alternatively, we affirm the district court's dismissal under
Rule 12(b)(6). In Haik L we found nothing suspicious
or unlawful about the Water Supply Agreement or Salt
Lake City and Alta1s "purported objective ... to curtail
further environmentally harmful development outside
Alta's 1976 town boundaries." Haik L 1999 WL 190717,
at *5. The same is true now, the Haiks' new allegations
notwithstanding.

6. The Misrepresentation Allegations Against Salt Lake
City, Alta, Niermeyer, and Guldner Fail to State a Claim
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[5]
Fraudulent-and negligent-misrepresentation
claims both require reasonable reliance on a
misrepresentation of material fact. Olsen v. Univ. of Phx.,
244 P.3d 388, 390 (Utah Ct.App.2010). The Hailes allege
that all Appellees are liable for misrepresentation due to
their alleged lies and ongoing deceit about Salt Lake City's
water supply. More specifically, they allege thatAppellees
led them to believe that Salt Lake City had no water
and that there were no plans to service the area, when
in fact both of those things were false-as shown by the
approved change applications. We think these allegations
are enough to give rise to a new and clifferent claim
for purposes of claim preclusion given that the Hai.ks
didn't know about the change applications before. Still,
the Haiks do not plead factual content that allows us to
draw the reasonable inference that anyone is liable for

this would have been false. As this lawsuit proves, Salt
Lake City has held firm to its longstanding representation
that it will not extend water as the Haiks desire.
If the Hailes had actually relied on Salt Lake City and
Alta's representations, they would not have filed suit to
compel the supply of water to their lots. This is their
prerogative, but they cannot claim that they filed their
lawsuits in reliance on anything Salt Lake City, Alta, or
any of its officials said. They filed because they believed
they were entitled to more water and that Salt Lake City
and Alta were wrongfully refusing it.

For these reasons, we believe the district court was correct
in dismissing the Haiks' misrepresentation claims under
Rule (12)(b)(6).

misrepresentation. 9
For one, we fail to see how a representation that Salt
Lake City did not have water available to service the
Albion Basin is false. The only argument the Hai.ks have
on this score is that the approved change applications
somehow gave Salt Lake City all the water it needed
to service their lots. As discussed above, however, the
change applications only authorized Salt Lake City to
change the point of diversion and place of use of water it
already had a right to use. True, the applications paved
the way for Salt Lake City to supply water to the Albion
Basin Subdivision. But they did not suddenly increase the
amount of water available in general, nor did they make
Salt Lake City's determination that there was not enough
surplus water to extend to the Hailes' lots a lie. After all,
Salt Lake City could decide there was no water "available"
to service the Albion Basin Subdivision for a number of
reasons, notwithstanding the city's physical or legal ability
to extend service.
We also fmd no reason to think it misleading for anyone
to represent that Salt Lake City had no plans to service the
*635 Albion Basin. From the beginning of this dispute,
Alta has maintained that Salt Lake City controls water
service to the Albion Basin Subdivision and Salt Lake City
has maintained that it will not supply water to the Haiks'
lots. 10 Both of those statements are entirely true and
continue to be true to this day. That Salt Lake City now
has the State Engineer's approval to supply to the Albion
Basin Subdivision does not mean the city has plans to do
so. Indeed, had Salt Lake City told the Haiks the opposite
-that it did have plans to service the area-it seems that

7. Relief from Judgment in Haik I
[6J The Haiks believe that their new allegations not only
state claims for relief but that they are also enough to set
aside the judgment in Haik I They allege that Salt Lake
City and Alta committed fraud on the court by concealing
the change applications and by dishonestly answering
the district court's questions about water availability
and plans for the Albion Basin Subdivision. 11 These
allegations do not come close to the ]evel of intentional
fraud or gross injustice required to set aside a previous
judgment.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60 governs relief from
final judgments and "does not limit a court's power to
entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a
judgment" or to "set aside a judgment for fraud on the
court." Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(d). Parties seeking relief from a
judgment through an independent action can do so only to
"prevent a grave miscarriage of justice." United States v.
Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38, 47, 118 S.Ct. 1862, 141 L.Ed.2d 32
(1998). It is a "narrow.avenue" for equitable relief, United
States v. Buck, 281 F.3d 1336, 1341 (10th Cir.2002), and
can only be based on recognized grounds, such as fraud.
Winfield Assocs., Inc. v. Stonecipher, 429 F.2d 1087, 1090
(10th Cir.1970). Similarly, a judgment can be set aside for
''fraud on the court" only in cases of "the most egregious
misconduct, such as bribery of a judge or members of a
jury, or the fabrication of evidence by a party in which an
attorney is implicated." Buck, 281 F.3d at 1342 (quoting
*636 Weese v. Schukman, 98 F.3d 542, 552-53 (10th
Cir.1996)). We review the district court's denial of relief on
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the ground of fraud upon the court for abuse of discretion.
Id
We have held that "nondisclosure to the court of facts
allegedly pertinent to the matter before it[ ] will not
ordinarily rise to the level of fraud on the court." Id The
nondisclosure of the change applications is no exception.
While the district court may have been curious about
water availability and any plans for the area, the change
applications were only marginally relevant to this inquiry
at best. As we've stated, the change applications did not
require Salt Lake City to supply water to the Haiks, nor
did they necessarily reveal Salt Lake City's plans for the
area. So, even if Salt Lake City's lawyer knew about the
approved change applications, we hardly think he_ lied
when he told the district court in Haik I that he thought
it "would be very difficult for [the city] to ever consider"
extending water service to the Albion Basin. 12 App. at 13,
~28.
More importantly, the disclosure of the change
applications would not have influenced the result in Haik
I Like the district court, we determined that Alta and
Salt Lake City could reasonably refuse water to the
Haiks and that, at most, the Haiks could only claim a
right to 50 gallons of water per day. Haik L 1999 WL
190717, at *l, *4: The parties agree that the approval of
Change Application a16846 authorized Salt Lake City to
use more water in the Albion Basin Subdivision. But we

never assumed that Salt Lake City lacked this authority
before. 13 We just said that no one was required to
extend water service to the Hailes' lots. Despite the Hailes'
arguments to the contrary, this simple fact remains true
today.
In sum, this case is a far cry from those involving the
kind of gross injustice that "demand[s] a departure from
rigid adherence to the doctrine of res judicata." Beggerly,
524 U.S. at 46, 118 S.Ct. 1862 (internal quotation marks
omitted). We find no abuse of discretion.

CONCLUSION
After reviewing the Haiks' complaint and the exhibits
attached to it, we conclude that none of their claims
survives dismissal. Three of the five claims are precluded
by Haik I, and the allegations are otherwise insufficient to
state a claim under Twombly and Iqbal. We also conclude
that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
denying the Haiks1 relief from our previous judgment. We
therefore affirm.
The Hailes' motion to certify is denied.
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Footnotes

*

The late Honorable William J. Holloway, United States Senior Circuit Judge, participated as a panel member when this
case was heard, but passed away before final disposition. "The practice of this Court permits the remaining two panel
judges, if in agreement, to act as a quorum in resolving the appeal." United States v. Wiles, 106 F.3d 1516, 1516 n. *
(10th Cir.1997); see also 28 U.S.C. § 46( d) (noting circuit court may adopt procedures permitting disposition of an appeal
where remaining quorum of panel agrees with the disposition). The remaining panel members have acted as a quorum
with respect to this order and judgment.

**

This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, claim preclusion, and
issue preclusion. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure
32.1 and Tenth Circuit Rule 32.1.
The Utah Supreme Court also reached this conclusion in a lawsuit brought by the previous owner of the Haiks' lots
seeking to compel the issuance of building permits. See Melville v. Salt Lake Cnty., 570 P .2d 687, 689 (Utah 1977) ("At
most plaintiffs have proved that they may have a right to 50 gallons of water per unit constructed, which does not meet
the County Board of Health's requirement of 400 gallons per unit per day."). As far as we know, the preclusive effect of
this judgment has never been argued.
We have recognized four requirements of issue preclusion:
(1) [T]he issue previously decided is identical with the one presented in the action in question, (2) the prior action
has been finally adjudicated on the merits, (3) the party against whom the doctrine is invoked was a party, or in

1

2
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privity with a party, to the prior adjudication, and (4) the party against whom the doctrine is raised had a full and fair
opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior action.
Park Lake Res. Ltd. Liab. Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 378 F.3d 1132, 1136 (10th Cir.2004). We discuss only the first

requirement because the other three are obviously satisfied.

3

We're not sure what the Haiks argue on this score. On the one hand, they contend that the State Engineer's approval
triggered Salt Lake City's "duty to supply" water to their lots. Appellants• Br. at 32. In their complaint, however, the Haiks
repeatedly allege that the approved cha[lge applications merely "authorized" Salt Lake City to supply water to the Albion
Basin Subdivision. See, e.g., App. at 33,

4

1f 125; App. at 42-43, 1f 175; App. at 55, 1f 244.

Because the Haiks lack a protected property interest, we do not reach the separate question of whether they were afforded
the appropriate level of process. See Brown v. Montoya, 662 F.3d 1152, 1167 (10th Cir.2011) ("[C)ourts must engage in a
two-step inquiry: (1) did the individual possess a protected interest such that the due process protections were applicable;
and, if so, then (2) was the individual afforded an appropriate level of process.") Accordingly, we need not evaluate the
district court's conclusions on that score and we deny the Haiks' motion asking us to take judicial notice of proceedings
before the Salt Lake Valley Board of Health.

5

As in Haik I, "we assume ~or the purposes of this discussion only that the Haiks may maintain an equal protection claim
against Salt Lake City." Haik I, 1999 WL 190717, at n. 2.

6

We question the Haiks' use of the word "homes" because there is no indication that anyone in the Albion Basin Subdivision

7

The complaint appears to allege a civil-conspiracy claim under Utah law, although the Haiks attempt to recast this

has received the necessary permits to develop their "lots"-terminology the Hai ks switch to in their brief.
claim under section 1983. Like the district court, we don't believe the complaint gives fair notice of a section 1983
conspiracy claim. Regardless, such a claim would also fail because the allegations do not set forth either a conspiracy or
a constitutionally protected right. See Dixon v. City of Lawton, Oki., 898 F.2d 1443, 1449 (10th Cir.1990) ("[T]o recover
under a§ 1983 conspiracy theory, a plaintiff must plead and prove not only a conspiracy, but also an actual deprivation
of rights .... ").

8

"To prove a civil conspiracy, plaintiff must show the following elements: (1) a combination of two or more persons, (2)
an object to be accomplished, (3) a meeting of the minds on the object or course of action; (4) one or more unlawful,
overt acts, and (5) damages as a proximate result thereof." Israel Pagan Estate v. Cannon, 746 P.2d 785, 790 (Utah
Ct.App.1987).

9

"To state a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation, a plaintiff must allege (1) that a representation was made (2) concerning
a presently existing material fact (3) which was false and (4) which the representer either (a) knew to be false or (b)
made recklessly, knowing that there was insufficient knowledge upon which to base such a representation, (5) for the
purpose of inducing the other party to act upon it and (6) that the other party, acting reasonably and in ignorance of its
falsity, (7) did in fact rely upon it (8) and was thereby induced to act (9) to that party's injury and damage." State v. Apotex

Corp., 282 P.3d 66, 80 (Utah 2012).

10

Niermeyer's letter maintained this status quo. To the extent the Haiks allege that Niermeyer lied with he told permitting
authorities that the Haiks had a right to 50 gallons per day under the allegedly defunct Little Cottonwood Contract, we fail
to see how this suggested overstatement of the Haiks' rights might support their misrepresentation claim.

11

At one point in the complaint, the Haiks also allege that Salt Lake City failed to disclose its unmetered water sales to
the Albion Basin Subdivision. To the extent this allegation is part of their claim for relief under Rule 60, we reject the
significance of this alleged nondisclosure as well. As discussed, these water sales do not carry any weight in the equalprotection context, and they do not indicate that Salt Lake City had a duty to supply water to the Haiks in the amounts
they desire.

12

We think it's entirely possible that the lawyer simply did not recall Change Application a 16846. According to the complaint,

13

The district court in Haik I did not assume this either, but the Haiks cite the following statement from the court's order

it was filed about five years before the hearing at issue, along with a dozen other change applications.
in suggesting otherwise: "The general duty imposed upon municipalities by Article XI, § 6 of the Utah Constitution ...
presupposes that the water to be supplied to inhabitants has already been lawfully acquired by the municipality." App. at
31 D n. 13. The district court made this comment in discussing Alta's municipal obligations, not Salt Lake City's. Of course,
the approveq change applications do not require Alta to supply water to the Haiks either.
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